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Statement of joint and solo work 
This thesis is on auditor regulation in Europe. It has five chapters: introduction (Chapter 
1), historical review of audit regulation in the EU and literature review (Chapter 2), two 
empirical chapters (Chapters 3 and 4), and conclusion (Chapter 5). The first empirical 
chapter (Chapter 3), which examines the costs and benefits of public oversight design 
in Europe, is a joint work with lead supervisor, Professor Annita Florou. The second 
empirical chapter (Chapter 4) is a solo paper investigating the consequences of 




With the publication of Directive 2006/43/EC, a system of public oversight over the 
audit profession was implemented across the European Union. This thesis analyses the 
resulting costs and benefits of national external audit monitoring systems, and evaluates 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public oversight practices in Europe. 
First, it reviews the development of audit regulation in Europe, both before and 
after the release of Directive 2006/43/EC. It then reviews previous studies on the effects 
of regulation and cost-benefit analyses. Besides, it reviews studies specifically on 
public oversight systems, mainly in the United States (US), with a small number outside 
the US. The literature suggests there is mixed evidence for the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public oversight system in the US, and further research is needed 
on public oversight systems, particularly in institutional settings outside the US. The 
two empirical chapters explore the audit pricing and quality consequences of the 
inspection regime, at pan-European and UK levels. Both studies find an increase in 
audit prices but no apparent impact on audit quality associated with audit inspection 
practice. 
This thesis contributes to the literature on audit regulation and has implications for 
policy making by auditing regulators. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The scandal of several accounting failures in the early 21st century (e.g. Enron and 
WorldCom) has severely diminished public confidence in the audit profession (e.g. 
Lennox 2009). In order to restore public confidence, there has been a trend for 
significant modifications to oversight of the audit profession (Groff and Hocevar 2009). 
As a member of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) stated, 
‘Inspections is [sic] the Board’s core function [and] the fundamental tool Congress gave 
the Board to restore public confidence in audited financial reporting’ (PCAOB 2005, 
cited by DeFond 2010, p.101).1 
In Europe, a system of public oversight over the audit profession was implemented 
across the European Union with the publication of Directive 2006/43/EC. Compared 
with a self-regulating system, oversight of the audit profession by an independent 
organisation enhances the integrity of audit services (e.g., Anantharaman 2007; 
Carcello, Hollingsworth, and Mastrolia 2011; Gramling, Krishnan, and Zhang 2011; 
Gunny and Zhang 2013). However, the functioning and efficacy of the new oversight 
bodies have been subject to criticism (e.g. DeFond 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010; 
Caramanis, Dedoulis, and Leventis 2015; Samsonova-Taddei and Humphrey 2015). 
This criticism relates to the lack of expertise or experience of oversight staff, the 
sweeping powers of the oversight authority, and ineffective feedback in its inspection 
reports (Simnett and Smith 2005; Palmrose 2006; Glover, Prawitt, and Taylor 2009; 
                                                 
1 The PCAOB was set up by the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), and is mainly responsible for public 
oversight of the audit profession in the US. 
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DeFond 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010). Niskanen (2006) goes so far as to state that 
‘The expensive new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is 
especially unnecessary … it is a private monopoly that has been granted both regulatory 
and taxing authority.’ 
In this context, this thesis analyses the costs and benefits of national external audit 
monitoring systems, and evaluates the efficiency and effectiveness of public oversight 
practice in Europe. Efficiency refers to whether potential benefits come at a cost. This 
thesis uses audit fees and audit firm switching to measure such costs. Effectiveness 
refers to the extent to which a national public oversight system is successful in 
producing the desired result (e.g. enhancing audit quality). This thesis employs 
accruals-based proxies and auditors’ opinions to capture such benefits. 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents a review of 
audit regulation development in Europe. This relates specifically to the legislative 
development of public oversight before and after the publication of Directive 
2006/43/EC, including consideration given to setting up a harmonised oversight 
structure before 2006, the publication of Directive 2006/43/EC in 2006, and further 
steps to refine and elaborate on the shape of the public oversight system after 2006. 
Chapter 2 then presents a review of previous studies, focusing first on a broad 
stream of literature on the effects of regulation and on cost-benefit analyses, based on 
Leuz and Wysocki (2016), and then on literature relating specifically to public oversight 
systems. These include public oversight studies based on the US and a few studies 
outside the US. Some US studies support the current national public oversight system 
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and consider that it has had a positive impact on audit quality, whereas others consider 
that the inspection regime is ineffective and does not bring corresponding benefits. Of 
the few studies based outside the US, some analyse quality assurance systems and 
others conduct cost-benefit analyses. Overall, there is mixed evidence for the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the public oversight system in the US, and further research is still 
needed on public oversight systems, particularly in institutional settings outside the US. 
Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the consequences of public oversight systems for audit 
pricing and audit quality, and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of public 
oversight practice in Europe. The mandatory adoption of public oversight in 2006 
required all EU member states to establish effective systems for public oversight of the 
audit profession. However, the ways in which the Directive has been implemented may 
have severely affected the degree to which it has achieved its goal of protecting the 
interests of investors. Chapter 3 presents a joint study of cross-country differences in 
the design of public audit oversight systems across the EU in order to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of the new audit regulation regime. In 
doing so, it examines the consequences for audit fees and audit quality of three 
potentially important features of the public oversight system: a) the composition of the 
public oversight authority (POA); b) the POA’s concentration of power; and c) the 
content of inspection reports. POA composition is measured by the mixture of non-
practitioners and practitioners; concentration of power examines the extent to which the 
POA has responsibility for the three functions of inspection, investigation and discipline; 
and the content of inspection reports is based on whether they provide an overall rating 
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of the quality of the audit firm under review. 
Drawing on a hand-collected dataset covering 24 EU countries for the period 
2005–2013, Chapter 3 documents wide variation in audit regulation systems across the 
EU. The study also reveals an economically significant increase in audit fees when only 
non-practitioners participate in audit firms’ national regulatory body or when the entire 
quality assurance process is performed by a POA. Thus, the findings suggest that audit 
costs increase when audit firm oversight is carried out by independent and potentially 
more objective POA members or by oversight authorities with greater enforcement 
power and potentially more efficient processes. However, no differences in audit quality 
are detected associated with alternative public oversight design choices. 
Having analysed POA characteristics at a pan-European level, Chapter 4 focuses 
on the UK and measures the potential costs and benefits of providing an overall quality 
rating for inspected audit firms. In the UK, audit inspection reports provide a detailed 
review of each inspected audit firm, including an overall quality rating for each audit 
engagement reviewed. The four points on the rating scale are Good, Limited 
Improvements Required, Improvements Required, and Significant Improvements 
Required. Accordingly, the costs and benefits of providing a summary score for the 
quality of the inspected audit firm are examined. The costs relate to the effect on audit 
fees and the likelihood of clients switching audit firms, while the benefits refer to the 
quality of assurance provided by the audit firms. 
Drawing on a large sample of UK-listed firms over the period 2008–2016, Chapter 
4 reveals a significant increase in audit fees when the audit firm has a higher proportion 
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of engagements with low ratings, which may arise from the additional effort required 
to meet Financial Reporting Council (FRC) requirements. Moreover, this significant 
increase in audit fees is more concentrated among firms with Big 4 audit firms. 
However, no evidence is found to suggest that FRC ratings may affect firms’ likelihood 
of switching audit firms, nor is any significant relationship found between FRC ratings 
and audit quality. This suggests that FRC ratings may not be perceived by audit 
committees as a signal of audit quality, and that inspections may be unable to 
distinguish between high- and low-quality audits. 
Chapter 5 concludes by providing a summary of the main results, implications and 
limitations of this thesis. The thesis contributes to the literature on audit regulation 
changes and their impact on auditor behaviour and incentives. Specifically, it 
contributes to debates on the trade-off between expertise and independence, the quality 
of the content of audit firm inspection reports, and the value of the audit firm inspection 
process. The results have implications for policy makers and regulators. 
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Chapter 2: Historical and Literature Reviews of Audit 
Regulation in the EU 
This chapter provides a review of the audit regulation in the EU. In doing so, this 
chapter describes the development of the quality assurance systems across EU Member 
States and helps us understand the institutional settings exploited in the two empirical 
chapters (i.e. Chapter 3 and 4). It then reviews a broad stream of literature on the effects 
of regulation and cost-benefit analyses, before turning specifically to studies of public 
oversight systems for the audit profession. 
2.1 Historical review of audit regulation in the EU 
2.1.1 Audit regulation before 2006 
Prior to the publication of Directive 2006/43/EC, a harmonised oversight structure for 
the audit profession had already been considered in Europe, and the European 
Commission (EC) had adopted various harmonised measures to develop a system of 
quality assurance for statutory audits across Europe (FEE 2006). 
In 1998, following its communication on ‘Statutory Audit in the European Union: 
The Way Forward’, the EC created a Committee on Auditing, which proposed to take 
further action and cooperate closely with the accounting profession (Osma, Gisbert, and 
De las Heras 2014). Following the creation of this Committee, in November 2000, the 
EC issued its ‘Recommendation on Quality Assurance for the Statutory Audit in the 
European Union: Minimum Requirements’ (FEE 2006), which stipulated minimum 
requirements for the implementation of public oversight in each EU member state 
(Osma et al. 2014). For example, with regard to membership, the recommendation 
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stated that POAs should have a majority of non-practitioners on their boards (EC 2000, 
p.95). With regard to public reporting, the recommendation required the results of 
quality assurance to be adequately reported, but did not require the results of quality 
assurance to be disclosed for individual audit firms. On disciplinary sanctions, it 
required POAs to initiate sanctions for auditors or audit firms receiving negative 
outcomes, including the ‘possibility of removal of the statutory auditor from the audit 
register’ (EC 2000, p.95). The recommendation also stated that those undertaking 
reviews should have ‘appropriate professional education and relevant experience 
combined with specific training on quality assurance reviews’ (EC 2000, p.96). 
In 2003, the Commission published a communication to the Council and the 
European Parliament ‘Reinforcing Statutory Audit in the EU’ (EC 2003a). This set out 
a plan to coordinate the mechanisms and harmonise public oversight systems across the 
EU. Specifically, the communication listed certain issues that required resolution across 
the EU: 
(a) the scope of oversight (e.g. education, licensing, standard setting, quality 
assurance, disciplinary systems), (b) the competences of oversight (e.g. 
investigative and disciplinary powers), (c) the composition of oversight boards 
(e.g. majority of non-practitioners, proper nomination procedures), (d) the 
transparency of oversight (e.g. publication of annual work programmes and 
activity reports), (e) the funding (e.g. not solely by the audit profession) (EC 
2003a, p.5). 
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The issues set out in this communication helped the Commission to establish a plan to 
develop minimum requirements for public oversight for inclusion in the 8th EU 
Directive. However, although the EC had already adopted various harmonised measures 
to develop a system of quality assurance in the audit profession before 2006, there was 
variation in quality assurance systems across Europe because implementation of these 
harmonised measures was not mandatory. 
Before 2006, there were numerous oversight structures for quality assurance of the 
audit profession across Europe. These can be grouped into three types: (a) 
professionally self-regulated or peer-reviewed, (b) governmental public oversight, and 
(c) mixed or unclearly defined oversight systems (Osma et al. 2014). Table 2.1 
categorises oversight structures in European countries prior to the introduction of the 
2006 Directive. 
Table 2.1 indicates some variations in quality assurance systems prior to 
publication of the 2006 Directive. Most of the 30 European countries, including 
Denmark, France and the UK, had no tradition of public oversight but had long-standing 
systems of self-regulation or peer review in which the audit profession played a 
significant supervisory role (Osma et al. 2014). By contrast, few countries had 
governmental public oversight systems, and only three countries (Finland, Malta and 
Sweden) had a separate public authority solely responsible for public oversight. Finally, 
eight countries had a mixed (Belgium, Germany, Norway and Spain) or unclearly 
defined system (Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal) prior to adoption of the Directive. 
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Table 2.1: Oversight structures prior to adoption of Directive 2006/43/EC in Europe 
Country Peer-Reviewed Governmental Public 
Oversight 
Mixed or unclearly 
defined 
Austria   √ 
Belgium   √ 
Bulgaria √   
Croatia √   
Cyprus √   
Czech Republic √   
Denmark √   
Estonia √   
Finland  √  
France √   
Germany   √ 
Greece   √ 
Hungary √   
Iceland √   
Ireland √   
Italy   √ 
Latvia √   
Lithuania √   
Luxembourg √   
Malta  √  
Netherlands √   
Norway   √ 
Poland √   
Portugal   √ 
Romania √   
Slovakia √   
Slovenia √   
Spain   √ 
Sweden  √  
United Kingdom √   
Source: FEE 2006; Osma et al. 2014; IFIAR 2013; Audit Council 2017 
Two countries that had professionally self-regulated peer-review systems were the 
Czech Republic and Ireland. The current POA in the Czech Republic is the Audit Public 
Oversight Council, which was created in 2009. Previously, quality assurance was the 
designated responsibility of a professional institute, the Chamber of Auditors. Under 
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the Chamber, Supervisory and Disciplinary Commissions had authority to monitor and 
examine audit services performed by auditors and audit firms (FEE 2006). 
The Irish Auditing and Accounting Supervisory Authority (IAASA) has been 
Ireland’s POA since 2006. Prior to that, quality assurance in the audit profession was 
the responsibility of two professional accountancy bodies, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants in 
Ireland (ICPAI) (FEE 2006). These two institutions took responsibility for quality 
assurance, which included registering and monitoring auditors (FEE, 2006). 
Examples of countries that had governmental public oversight prior to 2006 are 
Malta and Sweden. Malta has a long-term tradition of governmental public oversight. 
Its POA is the Accountancy Board, an independent body appointed by the Minister and 
established under the provisions of the Accountancy Profession Act 1979 (FEE 2006). 
This body is responsible for quality assurance enforcement, and disciplinary measures 
and sanctions (FEE 2006). 
A public oversight system has existed in Sweden for a long time, and the POA is 
the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants. This body was set up by the Swedish 
Parliament in the Auditors Act 1995, succeeded by the Auditors Act 2001 (IFIAR 2013). 
Its responsibilities include supervision, examination and enforcement of the audit 
profession’s compliance with standards in Sweden (FEE 2006; IFIAR 2013). 
Amongst countries with mixed or unclearly defined oversight systems, Germany 
had a mixed oversight system prior to adoption of the Directive. Public oversight 
activities in Germany at that time were carried out jointly by the German Chamber of 
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Public Auditors (WPK) and the Auditor Oversight Commission (AOC), which was the 
POA established by the Auditor Oversight Act (FEE 2006; Osma et al. 2014). 
Spain’s POA, prior to the implementation of Directive 2006/43/EC, was the 
Accounting and Auditing Institute (ICAC), and its organic structure was established in 
1989 (IFIAR 2013).2 Quality assurance activities were also carried out by three other 
professional institutes in Spain: The Registro de Economistas Auditores (REA), The 
Registro General de Auditores (REGA) and The Instituto de Censores Jurados de 
Cuentas de España (ICJCE) (Osma et al. 2014). 
2.1.2 Directive 2006/43/EC 
In order to harmonise supervision procedures for the audit profession and minimise 
differences between quality assurance systems in Europe, in 2006, the EC published 
Directive 2006/43/EC on ‘statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated 
accounts’. With the release of this Directive, a public oversight system was 
implemented across Europe, and each EU member state was required to establish a 
system of public oversight over the audit profession. The Directive stipulated 
requirements for the design of public oversight systems, such as the powers of the POA 
(2006/43/EC, article 32(4)), the frequency of inspections (2006/43/EC, article 29 (1h); 
article 43), the scope of inspections (2008/362/EC, paras. 17 and 19), and the disclosure 
of inspection results (2008/362/EC, para. 20). The content of this Directive is described 
in more detail in Chapter 3. 
                                                 
2 Although ICAC was set up in 1989, Spain did not incorporate the provisions of Directive 2006/43/EC until 2011, 
following approval of Royal Legislative Decree 2011 (IFIAR 2013). 
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Following several accounting scandals (e.g. Enron and Worldcom) and the 
collapse of Arthur Andersen in the early twenty-first century, public confidence in the 
audit profession had been heavily undermined (e.g. Campbell and Houghton 2005; 
Groff and Hocevar 2009; Lennox 2009). This led to a general trend for reinforcement 
of regulation over the auditing profession to strengthen investors’ confidence in 
financial reporting at that time. Reflecting this trend, the 2006 Directive proposed to 
improve the transparency and reliability of statutory audits by focusing on the 
importance of professional standards, independence and ethics, as well as promoting 
high-quality qualification requirements, including International Standards on Auditing 
(ISAs) (EFAA 2007). In implementing this Directive, the aforementioned EU 
Recommendation 2000 was recognised in law (FEE, 2006). The Recommendation was 
intended to ‘provide useful explanatory material and guidance as to how the 
requirements in Article 29 – on quality assurance systems – of the Statutory Audit 
Directive can be implemented’, whereas the Directive was ‘more stringent’ (FEE 
2006).3 
Nevertheless, the Directive was subjected to criticism. First, it permitted 
considerable differences in the designs of quality assurance systems. According to 
information from the Durham European Law Institute (2013), the 2006 Directive gave 
each EU member state considerable discretion in its implementation where 
corresponding national measures were diverse across the EU. It is therefore 
                                                 
3 For example, the 2006 Directive specified the time within which full coverage of all audit firms should be achieved 
(FEE, 2006). 
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questionable whether the Directive could achieve a uniformly high quality of auditing 
services across Europe. According to Groff and Hocevar (2009): 
Although the new requirements related to the audit profession entailed 
adjustments in national legislation of the Member States, the Directive still 
allows for considerable differences regarding how external quality assurance 
systems for statutory auditors and audit firms can be set up. 
Second, despite being an important part of POAs’ powers, the Directive only 
briefly mentioned investigations and sanctions, and provided no detail on investigation 
and sanctioning procedures (FEE 2014). For example, it did not give a detailed list of 
sanctions that POAs could impose on auditors or audit firms. Finally, despite being a 
pan-European reform, the 2006 Directive did not set up an organised body or group to 
facilitate cooperation between POAs across Europe, including coordination of the tasks 
required by the new legislation (FEE 2014). 
2.1.3 Development of public oversight after 2006 
With the publication of Directive 2006/43/EC, public oversight of the audit profession 
was implemented across Europe. The EC then took further steps to refine and elaborate 
on the shape of public oversight, addressing some matters which were not clearly 
defined in Directive 2006/43/EC. 
In May 2008, the EC issued a ‘Recommendation on external quality assurance for 
statutory auditors and audit firms auditing public interest entities’. This 
Recommendation focused specifically on the quality assurance of public interest 
entities and outlined certain concepts in greater detail (FEE 2008): 
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(a) Inspectors: The Recommendation clearly stated the criteria that inspectors should 
meet (2008/362/EC, pp.21–23). For example, they could not be associated with a 
practising statutory auditor, and a two-year cooling-off period was required after 
they had ceased any association with the practising auditors or audit firms with 
which they had previously been associated (2008/362/EC, p.22). 
(b) Scope of inspections: Inspections were required to cover the internal quality 
control policies, procedures and standards of the audit firm, conduct adequate 
compliance testing of procedures and a review of audit files, and assess the most 
recent annual transparency report (2008/362/EC, p.23). 
(c) Outcomes of inspections: The competent authority was required to communicate 
appropriately and discuss the inspection findings and conclusions with the audit 
firm before an inspection report was finalised (2008/362/EC, p.23). Based on this, 
the audit firm was allowed a maximum of 12 months from the issuance of the 
inspection report to take action in respect of the recommendations (2008/362/EC, 
p.23). In case of inappropriate follow-up, the POA was required to disclose any 
major deficiencies in the internal quality control system (2008/362/EC, p.23). 
In addition, the POA was required to inform the public in a timely and appropriate 
manner of any final disciplinary actions taken or penalties imposed on auditors or audit 
firms, and to provide details of the statutory audit firm concerned and the major 
deficiencies associated with the disciplinary action or penalty (2008/362/EC, p.23). 
Any significantly misleading transparency reports were to be amended in a timely 
manner (2008/362/EC, p.24), and POAs were to report annually on the overall results 
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of the quality assurance system (2008/362/EC, p.24). 
Following several years of discussion, Directive 2014/56/EU was published in 
May 2014. Most criteria remain unchanged from the 2006 Directive (FEE 2014), but 
some changes are relevant to quality assurance. These are summarised in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1: Changes to Directive 2006/43/EC
 
Source: FEE, 2014; EC 2006, 2014a, 2014b 
(a) Frequency of quality assurance reviews: Under the 2006 Directive, quality 
assurance reviews had to take place at least every six years (2006/43/EC, article 
29(1)(h)). Under the 2014 Directive, the frequency of reviews is based on analysis 
of the risk, while the maximum period between reviews remains six years 
(2014/56/EU, article 1(24)(a)(ii)). 
(b) Further requirements on quality assurance reviewers: The new Directive places 
further requirements on quality assurance reviewers, namely that: (a) they should 
have professional education, relevant experience and specific training on quality 
assurance reviews; (b) at least three years must have elapsed since they have ceased 
to have any association with the statutory audit firm to be reviewed; (c) they are 
required to declare that there are no conflicts of interest between them and the 
statutory audit firm to be reviewed (2014/56/EU, article 1(24)(b)). 
(c) Delegation of oversight powers: Directive 2006/43/EC stated that the quality 
assurance system should be the responsibility of the competent authority, governed 


















experts to assist in its task (2006/43/EC, article 32). Directive 2014/56/EU clearly 
states that the competent authority may ‘delegate or allow the competent authority 
to delegate any of its tasks to other authorities or bodies designated or otherwise 
authorised by law to carry out such tasks’ (2014/56/EU, article 32(4) (b)). However, 
Regulation 537/2014 places some restrictions on the delegation of oversight 
powers relevant to the review of audits for public interest entities (PIEs). 
Specifically, the competent authority cannot delegate quality assurance, 
investigation, or sanctions and measures relating to quality assurance reviews or 
investigation of statutory audits of PIEs (No 537/2014, p.81). 
(d) Further requirements for sanctions: The 2006 Directive only briefly mentioned the 
system of investigations and sanctions. Specifically, it stated that there should be 
‘an effective system of investigations and sanctions to detect, correct and prevent 
inadequate execution of the statutory audit’ (2006/43/EC, article 30(1)). It required 
member states to provide for sanctions where statutory auditors and audit firms had 
not carried out an audit in conformity with the provisions stipulated in the Directive 
(2006/43/EC, article 30(2)). The Directive also required the public disclosure of 
sanctions imposed on auditors or audit firms (2006/43/EC, article 30(3)). In 
comparison, the 2014 Directive gives a more detailed statement of sanctioning 
procedures (FEE 2014). It lists a series of sanctioning measures that the competent 
authority may impose on auditors and audit firms, including a public statement of 
a person’s breaches, and prohibition from conducting audits (2014/56/EU, article 
30a). The 2014 Directive outlines ways in which the competent authority may 
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impose sanctions, either directly, in collaboration with other authorities or by 
applying to judicial authorities (2014/56/EU, article 30a). It sets out factors that the 
competent authority should consider when imposing sanctions, for example the 
gravity and duration of the breach, and previous breaches by those responsible 
(2014/56/EU, article 30b). It also contains guidelines on the publication of 
sanctions and measures. For example, the authority is required to publish details of 
administrative sanctions imposed for any breaches on its official website 
(2014/56/EU, article 30c). The 2014 Directive also provides for the exchange of 
information regarding sanctions imposed and administrative measures taken by the 
competent authority. This is to be communicated to the Committee of European 
Auditing Oversight Bodies (CEAOB), which will include this information in its 
annual report. The competent authority must also communicate immediately with 
the CEAOB regarding all temporary prohibitions imposed on auditors or audit 
firms (2014/56/EU, article 30f). 
(e) Cooperation of audit oversight bodies and supervision: Directive 2014/56/EU set 
up a new body, the CEAOB, which is responsible for coordinating the activities of 
national competent authorities (2014/56/EU, article 14.3). 
Compared with the 2006 Directive, the new Directive provides greater 
transparency and more detailed requirements pertaining to quality assurance systems 
(e.g. delegation of oversight powers, sanctioning procedures). According to the FEE 
(2018), the new Directive has had a significant impact on the organisation of public 
oversight of the audit profession. Specifically, it improves the coordination of audit 
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supervision and facilitates auditors in operating across the EU (ICAEW 2018). For 
example, the CEAOB will coordinate the activities of national competent authorities 
(2014/56/EU, article 14.3). 
Nevertheless, it is too early to claim that the new Directive has been entirely 
successful. For example, with the implementation of the new Directive, the POA plays 
a greater role, as certain oversight functions can no longer be delegated to other bodies 
regarding audits of PIEs. According to the FEE (2018), POAs are now responsible for 
additional activities previously carried out by professional bodies. More powerful 
oversight authorities may, to some extent, increase the efficiency of the overall quality 
assurance system (Gunny and Zhang 2013), but highly concentrated power may limit 
POAs’ accountability and transparency due to fewer ‘checks and balances’ (Campbell 
and Houghton 2005; Glover et al. 2009), which will reduce the rigour of audit scrutiny. 
Therefore, further evidence is required to determine the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the regime outlined by the new Directive. 
2.1.4 Summary of audit regulation development in the EU 
Prior to 2006, as a result of several accounting scandals in the early twenty-first century, 
the EC was considering ending the long-standing practice of self-regulation and setting 
up a harmonised public oversight structure for the audit profession. Steps taken in this 
regard included the establishment of the Committee on Auditing in 1998, the release of 
the ‘Recommendation on quality assurance for the statutory audit in the European 
Union: Minimum requirements’ in 2000, and the ‘Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament reinforcing statutory audit in 
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the EU’ for the audit profession in 2003. However, as there was no mandatory 
requirement for the adoption of a public oversight system before 2006, quality 
assurance across Europe was somewhat diverse. With the publication of the 2006 
Directive, a public oversight system was mandatorily implemented across Europe, and 
each EU member state was required to establish a system of public oversight over the 
audit profession. However, as this Directive only established basic principles and 
minimum requirements for the organisation of public oversight, each member state had 
considerable flexibility to interpret this provision and design its own POA, resulting in 
heterogeneous POA designs around Europe. After 2006, the EC took further steps to 
refine and detail the shape of public oversight, including the release of 
Recommendation 2008 and Directive 2014/56/EU. Compared with the 2006 Directive, 
the 2014 Directive provides greater transparency and predictability of requirements 
pertaining to audit firms, including the frequency of quality assurance reviews, further 
requirements on quality assurance reviewers, delegation of oversight powers, further 
requirements for sanctions and cooperation of audit oversight bodies and supervision. 
Overall, the early twenty-first century saw the end of an era of self-regulation of the 
audit profession in Europe and the implementation of a public oversight system across 
European countries. The EC has continued progressively to shape and refine public 
oversight systems in Europe. 
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2.2 Literature review 
This section begins by reviewing a broader stream of literature on the effects of 
regulation and cost-benefit analyses. This is based on Leuz and Wysocki (2016), who 
provide a very recent and comprehensive review of literature on the economic 
consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, such as the Sarbanes–
Oxley Act (SOX) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The focus 
then turns specifically to studies of public oversight systems for the audit profession. 
2.2.1 Review of relevant studies on regulation 
The numerous streams of research on auditing and financial reporting provisions 
include studies on the introduction of the US Securities Act 1933 and Exchange Act 
1934 (e.g. Stigler 1964; Jarrell 1981; Simon 1989; Greenstone, Oyer, and Vissing-
Jorgensen 2006; Ferrell 2007; Battalio, Hatch, and Loughran 2011; Daines and Jones 
2012); Regulation Fair Disclosure (e.g. Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva 2003; Heflin, Shaw, 
and Wild 2003; Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Venkataraman 2004; Gintschel and 
Markov 2004; Francis, Nanda, and Wang 2006; Gomes, Gorton, and Madureira 2007; 
Duarte et al. 2008; Sidhu et al. 2008; Chen, Dhaliwal, and Xie 2010); the SOX (e.g. 
Alexander et al. 2013; Leuz and Schrand 2009; Iliev 2010; Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 
2010; Kang, Liu, and Qi 2010; Albuquerque and Zhu 2013; Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2008, 
Koh, Matsumoto, and Rajgopal 2008, Bartov and Cohen 2009); and IFRS (e.g. Daske 
et al. 2008; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber 2010; Gordon, Jorgensen, and Linthicum 2010; 
Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki 2010a, 2010b; Barth et al. 2012; Capkun, Collins, and 
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Jeanjean 2012; Ahmed, Neel, and Wang 2013; Christensen, Hail, and Leuz 2013; 
Florou and Kosi 2015). 
These studies discuss the costs and benefits of the respective regulations, and 
analyse the efficiency and effectiveness of government policy. With regard to benefits, 
some studies measure these using stock returns (e.g. Stigler 1964; Jarrell 1981; Bushee 
and Leuz 2005; Akhigbe and Martin 2006; Jain and Rezaee 2006; Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein 2007). For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that firms that 
make more changes to comply with SOX earn more positive abnormal returns around 
key SOX events than firms that are already more compliant. Some studies use other 
proxies to measure benefits, such as market liquidity (e.g. Daines and Jones 2012; Jain, 
Kim, and Rezaee 2008; Daske et al. 2008, Christensen et al. 2013), operating 
performance (e.g. Greenstone et al. 2006), informativeness of analysts’ reports and 
accuracy of forecasts (e.g. Gintschel and Markov 2004; Bailey et al. 2003; Heflin et al. 
2003; Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen 2006) and audit quality (e.g. Dyck, Morse, and 
Zingales 2010; DeFond and Lennox 2011). 
With regard to costs, one proxy used to measure these is audit fees (e.g. Iliev 2010; 
Kim, Liu, and Zheng 2012; De George, Ferguson, and Spear 2013). For example, De 
George et al. (2013) document a significant increase in audit fees after implementing 
IFRS for Australian companies, particularly among small companies with greater 
exposure to audit complexity and compliance costs in transitioning to IFRS. In addition 
to audit fees, some studies measure cost using debt contracting (e.g. Ball, Li, and 
Shivakumar 2015; Chen, Harford, and Lin 2015; Brown 2016). For example, Ball et al. 
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(2015) find that IFRS adoption may be costly for debt contracting. 
Overall, different studies use different measures as proxies for the benefits and 
costs of audit regulation. However, Leuz and Wysocki (2016) provide several important 
insights and suggestions for future regulation studies. First, they point out that many 
regulatory studies have been unable to provide causal estimates and identify 
counterfactuals in order to clearly identify regulatory effects. Second, they suggest that 
it is important for regulation studies to know the process through which the relevant 
regulation has arisen. An example is whether policy makers and regulators are under 
pressure to take corrective action (e.g. after disclosure of a scandal), which may give 
rise not only to fine-tuning of existing regulation, but also to overreaction and ever-
increasing regulation. Third, it is worth paying greater attention to the dynamics and 
evolution of disclosure and reporting regulation. An example is how the costs and 
benefits of IFRS evolve over time, for example whether they change at different stages 
of a country’s economic development. Fourth, Leuz and Wysocki indicate the 
importance of looking at the macroeconomic outcomes of a regulation, such as real 
investment, consumption and possibly social outcomes. Finally, they point out that a 
specific regulation is part of a larger institutional system, and it is therefore important 
to look at its interaction with other government provisions or elements. Overall, Leuz 
and Wysocki (2016) provide some useful and important insights for empirical studies 
of government provisions. 
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2.2.2 Studies on public oversight of the audit profession 
Research on public oversight of the audit profession potentially fits within the realm of 
agency theory (e.g. Arrow 1971; Wilson 1968; Ross 1973; Jensen and Meckling 1976), 
where the audit client delegates the work to audit firms, and the completed work is 
supervised by the oversight authority. Research on public oversight began in the last 
decade, and most studies have been based on the US (e.g. Palmrose 2006; 
Anantharaman 2007; Hermanson, Houston, and Rice 2007; Lennox 2009; Glover et al. 
2009; DeFond 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Carcello et al. 2011; DeFond and 
Lennox 2011; Gramling et al. 2011; Offermanns 2011; Abernathy, Barnes, and 
Stefaniak 2013; Abbott, Gunny, and Zhang 2012; Acito, Hogan, and Mergenthaler 2013; 
Bishop, Hermanson and Houston 2013; Gunny and Zhang 2013; Lamoreaux 2013; 
Nagy 2014; Boone, Khurana, and Raman 2015; Shroff 2015; Gipper, Leuz, and Maffett 
2015; DeFond and Lennox 2017). Studies analysing public oversight systems outside 
the US are very scarce (e.g. Carson, Simnett, and Vaanstraelen 2017; Cheon et al. 2016). 
In 2002, with the passage of SOX in the US, the PCAOB was set up with 
responsibility for conducting regular inspections of firms auditing public companies. 
Since then, public oversight has replaced self-regulation as the quality assurance 
mechanism in the US. Several studies shed light on the PCAOB and analyse the 
consequences of the new inspection regime. Among these, some claim that the 
establishment of the PCAOB has had a positive effect on the market and has been 
helpful in strengthening investors’ confidence in financial reporting (e.g. DeFond and 
Lennox 2011; Abbott et al. 2012; Nagy 2014; Gipper et al. 2015; DeFond and Lennox 
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2017). Others allege that the PCAOB has not brought corresponding benefits and has 
had no marked impact on the market (e.g. Hilary and Lennox 2005; Glover et al. 2009; 
Casterella, Jensen, and Knechel 2009; DeFond 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010). 
Overall, it is difficult to determine whether the current public oversight system is 
superior or inferior to the previous peer-review system, and there is no conclusive 
evidence on the impact of the PCAOB. 
Studies supporting the current public oversight system in the US explore the issue 
from various angles. First, some studies seek to analyse the impact of the public 
oversight system on audit quality (e.g. Carcello et al. 2011; Gramling et al. 2011). 
Specifically, Carcello et al. (2011) examine its impact on the quality of audits of Big 4 
audit firms following the first two PCAOB inspections. Using abnormal accruals as a 
proxy for audit quality, they find a significant decrease in abnormal accruals following 
the first PCAOB inspection, and a continued reduction in abnormal accruals after 
completion of the second inspection. This reduction is even larger in the second year 
than in the first. Thus, the results suggest that audit quality improves in each of the first 
two years following a PCAOB inspection. However, this result only applies to Big 4 
audit firms, and whether it is applicable to small audit firms is as yet unknown. 
In contrast to Carcello et al.’s (2011) focus on Big 4 audit firms, Gramling et al. 
(2011) study small audit firms to investigate whether deficiencies identified by the 
PCAOB are associated with a change in triennially-inspected audit firms’ going concern 
opinions on financially distressed clients. Based on inspections from 2004 to 2006, they 
find that audit firms with deficiencies found by the PCAOB are more likely to issue a 
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going concern opinion following the PCAOB inspection; in contrast, there is only 
limited evidence for such an association for audit firms with no audit deficiencies 
indicated in their PCAOB inspection reports. These results indicate that audit firms with 
deficiencies identified by the PCAOB are more likely to ‘stand up to the client’ and ‘be 
tough’ on important reporting issues, or bring a greater level of expertise to bear on the 
reporting decision. 
Rather than measuring actual audit quality, the second group of studies supporting 
the current public oversight system focuses on perceived audit quality and examines 
whether the public oversight system may affect audit firms’ market share (e.g. Abbott 
et al. 2012; Nagy 2014). In looking at the signalling role of PCAOB inspection reports, 
Abbott et al. (2012) find that effective audit committees are very responsive to cases 
where audit firms receive deficient reports, and this is particularly obvious if the 
deficiency relates to a GAAP violation. Based on this, their study also finds that clients 
with less inside ownership are more likely to switch away from an audit firm following 
a GAAP-deficient PCAOB inspection report. This suggests that effective audit 
committees and firms with effective external monitoring from outside are more 
responsive to PCAOB inspection reports of deficiencies. 
Abbott et al.’s (2012) study concentrates on deficiencies in part one of the 
inspection report, which mainly concern deficiencies in the audit engagements under 
review. Nagy (2014) focuses specifically on deficiencies in part two of the PCAOB 
inspection report, which contains information about audit firms’ quality control systems 
that is only publicly disclosed if the audit firm fails to mitigate the defects of the quality 
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control system appropriately within 12 months (e.g. Bishop et al. 2013). Using a sample 
of audit firms under PCAOB inspection with disclosures of quality control defects, 
Nagy (2014) examines whether disclosure of these part two defects may affect audit 
firms’ market share. The results show that firms’ market share shrinks significantly 
following public disclosure of part two deficiencies, indicating that audit clients view 
this part as providing a credible signal of audit quality. The results also indicate that 
audit clients treat the disclosure of quality control reports as a credible signal of low 
audit quality, and that clients are more likely to switch from audit firms with this type 
of disclosure. 
Rather than directly measuring the impact of the public oversight system on actual 
or perceived audit quality as above, a third group of studies examines the implications 
of the public oversight system for the capital market and clients’ financing and 
investment decisions (e.g. Shroff 2015; Gipper et al. 2015). Regarding the capital 
market, they examine whether the PCAOB inspection regime strengthens investors’ 
responses to issuers’ earnings surprises, in order to establish whether the inspection 
regime increases the underlying credibility of reported earnings. Gipper et al. (2015) 
analyse the PCAOB inspection regime to determine whether there is any improvement 
in capital market responses to unexpected earnings releases. Based on changes in short-
window stock market reactions to earnings announcements, they find that the capital 
market has responded to unexpected earnings increases since the PCAOB inspection 
regime was established. They also find a rise in abnormal volume responses to clients’ 
10-K filings under the new regime. 
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In terms of impact on clients’ financing and investment decisions, in order to 
isolate the exogenous effects of reporting quality, Shroff (2015) tests the reporting 
quality of non-US audit clients audited by PCAOB-inspected audit firms. Using the 
PCAOB international inspection programme as a setting in which to examine the effects 
of the inspection regime on clients’ financing and investment decisions, Schroff (2015) 
finds that the regime does change such decisions when the inspection report is disclosed. 
More specifically, they find that non-US companies increase their long-term debt 
(investment) by 11.5 per cent (10.9 per cent) and are more sensitive to investment 
opportunities. This implies that public oversight by the PCAOB has spillover effects on 
non-US companies and facilitates their access to financial and other investment 
resources. 
In addition to the above studies, other research also supports the current PCAOB 
inspection regime (e.g. Anantharaman 2007; DeFond and Lennox 2011; Lamoreaux 
2013; DeFond and Lennox 2017). In comparing the peer-review system with public 
oversight by the PCAOB, Anantharaman (2007) finds that the outcomes of previous 
peer-review reports provide less credible information about audit firms’ audit quality 
than the public oversight system. She argues that ‘firms that themselves review other 
firms consistently receive more favorable opinions from peer reviews than from 
PCAOB reviews’. She also suggests that the results of peer-review reports are not 
objective opinions on the real audit quality of audit firms, as audit firms are able to 
control peer-review outcomes by choosing ‘friendly reviewers’. 
DeFond and Lennox (2011) focus specifically on exiting audit firms following the 
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passage of the SOX. They demonstrate that the establishment of the PCAOB has had a 
positive effect on the audit market, resulting in 600 small, relatively low-quality audit 
firms exiting the market since the SOX. In addition, clients of exiting audit firms 
receive higher-quality audits from successor audit firms. Lamoreaux (2013) compares 
audit firms in jurisdictions allowing PCAOB inspections with audit firms prohibiting 
PCAOB inspections, and finds that the former are more inclined to issue a going 
concern opinion and material weakness for clients than the latter. Overall, this study 
illustrates that PCAOB inspection exposure may affect audit firms’ reporting incentives, 
thereby influencing audit quality. 
Finally, a recent study by DeFond and Lennox (2017) emphasises the deficiencies 
associated with audit firms’ issuance of internal control opinions on audit clients. Their 
study differs from the many studies looking at all deficiencies in the PCAOB inspection 
report by focusing specifically on deficiencies in internal control procedures. They find 
that audit firms that receive higher rates of deficiencies in internal control procedures 
in their PCAOB reports issue adverse internal control opinions more frequently to their 
clients. They also find that higher rates of internal control deficiencies may push up 
audit fees, probably due to costly remediation efforts. 
Overall, previous studies provide evidence that the PCAOB inspection regime is 
effective and brings corresponding benefits. First, the PCAOB inspection regime may 
shape audit firms’ incentives to improve actual audit quality. Second, the inspection 
regime may affect perceived audit quality, thereby influencing audit firms’ market share. 
Third, PCAOB inspection results are useful in affecting investors’ responses to issuers’ 
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earnings surprises and clients’ financing and investment decisions. Finally, some 
studies provide further evidence that the current inspection regime in the US is taken 
by the market to be credible. 
However, alongside studies supporting the current public oversight system in the 
US, some studies argue that the PCAOB inspection regime is inefficient, and that the 
inspection results have no value in signalling audit quality (e.g. Hilary and Lennox 2005; 
Glover et al. 2009; Casterella et al. 2009; DeFond 2010; Lennox and Pittman 2010). 
Glover et al. (2009) claim that the PCAOB’s function and operation have been 
hampered by its early choices, incentives, organisational composition and structure. 
Specifically, they find that the PCAOB has neither adequate resources nor the expertise 
to create standards that might take the place of those set by the Auditing Standards 
Board (ASB) or the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) in 
terms of timeliness and relevance. Moreover, they observe significant flaws in the 
PCAOB’s inspection and enforcement owing to concerns relating to the expertise and 
incentives of PCAOB staff, the lack of processes and accountability, political 
motivations and flawed incentives, and ineffective, untimely inspection feedback. 
In contrast to Glover et al. (2009), who deal directly with flaws in the PCAOB’s 
function and operation, Lennox and Pittman (2010) analyse the signalling role of 
PCAOB inspection reports. They find that audit clients do not perceive PCAOB reports 
to be useful in distinguishing between high and low audit quality. They also find that 
the invaluable role of PCAOB reports potentially lies in information that the PCAOB 
does not publish, such as overall quality ratings and information on audit firms’ quality 
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control systems. 
Building on Lennox and Pittman’s (2010) general results, DeFond (2010) 
demonstrates that PCAOB inspection results may lack information value. Specifically, 
he points out that weaknesses identified by PCAOB inspections may not be 
representative due to concerns about the audit firm’s client base or the average audit 
quality of the audit firm. He also states that the information value of PCAOB inspection 
results may be further reduced if reports are too detail-oriented and identify trivial and 
inconsequential audit weaknesses. 
Rather than questioning the efficiency and effectiveness of the public oversight 
system directly, some studies explore the benefits of the long-standing self-regulation 
system in the US. Based on the outcomes of peer-review reports, Hilary and Lennox 
(2005) examine whether opinions issued by peer reviewers credibly distinguish audit 
quality. They find that audit firms gain clients after receiving clean opinions in their 
peer-review reports and lose clients after receiving modified or adverse opinions. This 
suggests that peer-review outcomes may provide a credible signal of differences in audit 
quality between audit firms. 
Consistent with Hilary and Lennox’s (2005) results, Casterella et al. (2009) use a 
unique and proprietary dataset from the files of an insurance company to explore the 
association between peer-review outcomes and audit quality. However, in contrast to 
Hilary and Lennox (2005), who focus on perceived audit quality, Casterella et al. (2009) 
test actual audit quality and find that the number of weaknesses identified in a firm’s 
peer-review report is positively related to the likelihood that that firm will have a 
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malpractice claim filed against it. Furthermore, the types of peer-review deficiencies 
highlighted in the report are helpful in predicting audit failure (i.e. malpractice claims 
alleging audit firm negligence). They also provide evidence that peer-review findings 
are associated with firm-specific indicators of potentially weak quality control or risky 
practices within audit firms. These results imply that peer-review reports under the self-
regulated system of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 
are credible in distinguishing the actual quality of an audit firm. 
Overall, these studies suggest that the current PCAOB inspection regime in the US 
is potentially ineffective and may need further refinement, and it appears that the long-
standing peer-review system is more beneficial and may provide signals of differences 
in audit quality across audit firms. 
In addition to studies contributing to debate over the advantages and disadvantages 
of the PCAOB, other US studies analyse the quality assurance system from different 
angles. Hermanson et al. (2007) provide descriptive evidence on inspection reports 
issued to small CPA firms. In analysing 316 PCAOB inspection reports issued to 
smaller audit firms up to 13 July 2006, they find that around 60 per cent of firms had 
deficiencies, and that these firms were normally growing faster than firms with no 
deficiencies. Moreover, they find that deficiencies were more likely to be identified in 
initial inspections conducted in 2004, and that firms with deficiencies were smaller, less 
profitable and more highly leveraged. In addition, they find that deficiencies mentioned 
in inspection reports pertained mainly to substantive procedures and lack of adequate 
analyses and procedures. Deficiencies tended to concentrate on the balance sheet, and 
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often related to revenues, receivables, equity and liabilities. 
Rather than looking at deficiencies issued for small audit firms, Bishop et al. (2013) 
measure the PCAOB inspections of international firms. Based on a sample of 175 first-
time and 56 second-time inspection reports issued up to 2012, they find that most 
deficiencies found in inspection reports are quality control defects. Firms with 
deficiencies are smaller and have more issuer clients than non-deficiency firms. In 
terms of the rate of deficiencies, they find no significant differences between the 
PCAOB acting alone or cooperating with a local regulator in carrying out an inspection. 
With regard to studies of settings other than the US, a paper by Cheon et al. (2016) 
is one of very few based on a non-US setting. Based on a study in South Korea, they 
claim an association between audit quality and inspection results. Specifically, they find 
that audit quality is associated with both quality control system deficiencies and audit 
engagement deficiencies reported in inspection reports. Carson et al.’s (2017) study, 
also focusing on a non-US setting, is one of few that are closely related to the research 
presented in this thesis. Using a sample of companies from 51 countries over the period 
2003–2012, they seek to determine the effectiveness of different forms of public 
oversight and inspection regimes that have been implemented in different jurisdictions. 
They find that audit quality has improved in countries with public oversight systems in 
the post-implementation period, but find only limited evidence supporting any 
relationship between audit quality and different features of the inspection process. 
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2.2.3 Summary 
This literature review began by reviewing a broad stream of literature on the effects of 
regulation and cost-benefit analyses, such as the impact of the SOX and IRFS, based 
on Leuz and Wysocki (2016). It then focused specifically on studies of public oversight 
systems for the audit profession. The latter potentially fits within the realm of agency 
theory. Primary studies of public oversight started in the last decade, following the 
passage of the SOX in 2002, and most have been based on the US. Among these, some 
support the current public oversight system in the US and consider the PCAOB 
inspection regime to have had a positive impact on audit quality and to have been 
beneficial to various stakeholders, including audit clients and investors. However, other 
studies observe that the PCAOB inspection regime is ineffective and has not brought 
corresponding benefits. Some US studies analyse the quality assurance system from 
other angles. In addition to studies of the US system, a few studies analyse the quality 
assurance systems of non-US settings. Finally, some regulation studies provide cost–
benefit analyses. 
Overall, there appears to be mixed evidence on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
public oversight in the US, with mixed conclusions on the quality of the content of audit 
firm inspection reports and the value of the audit firm inspection process. Therefore, 
further research is needed on public oversight systems, especially in institutional 




Chapter 3: Costs and Benefits of Public Oversight – Design 
Evidence from the EU 
3.1 Introduction 
Having reviewed audit regulation developments in the EU and previous literature on 
quality assurance systems, this chapter presents the empirical setting of the EU and 
examines public oversight practices in European countries. In response to a wave of 
prominent financial reporting failures worldwide, public oversight of audit firms was 
introduced to restore confidence in the audit profession. Several previous studies have 
sought to measure the impacts of the new system. Carson et al. (2017) examine the 
effects of the introduction of public audit oversight on audit quality. Using an 
international sample for the period 2003 to 2012, they document higher audit quality in 
the post-inspection period in countries that have periodic inspections under a public 
oversight system, with a stronger effect for Big 4 audit firms. In addition, they find 
limited evidence that audit quality varies with inspection characteristics such as 
frequency of inspection. 
However, the study presented in this chapter differs in several ways from that of 
Carson et al. (2017). First, Carson et al. (2017) focus only on the potential benefits of 
the new regulatory system for auditors, whereas this study examines both the costs, in 
the form of audit fees, and the benefits, measured by a number of audit quality proxies, 
of the public oversight regime; in doing so, the current thesis provides a more 
comprehensive study of the consequences of changes to audit regulation. Second, 
Carson et al. (2017) treat the examination of alternative inspection characteristics only 
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as supplementary analysis, whereas this study focuses on cross-country variations in 
the design of new public oversight systems. Third, the inspection characteristics 
considered by Carson et al. (2017) include direct inspections versus oversight of the 
inspection process, or a combination of the two, the frequency of inspections, the public 
disclosure and types of disclosure of inspection results, and the enforcement ability of 
the new public oversight body. In contrast, this study investigates the membership of 
oversight bodies, in terms of the participation of non-practitioners versus practitioners, 
the powers of oversight bodies, i.e. the extent to which oversight responsibility includes 
the tasks of inspection, investigation, and discipline, and the content of inspection 
reports, i.e. the provision of overall ratings of the quality of inspected audit firms. 
Finally, there are also research design differences between the two studies. Rather than 
using a global sample, as in Carson et al. (2017), this study focuses on the EU. As 
discussed earlier, the 2006 Directive applies to all EU member states, but at the same 
time allows significant flexibility in the implementation of specific requirements. 
Therefore, focusing on EU countries provides an institutional setting in which there is 
significant cross-country variation in the design of public oversight systems within a 
common regulatory framework. Overall, the current study and that of Carson et al. 
(2017) are complementary and contribute to the recent public oversight literature. 
As indicated above, this chapter looks at different institutional characteristics of 
POAs, namely membership, concentration of power and content of inspection reports. 
It focuses on these characteristics for several reasons. First, the membership and powers 
of POAs are central to the provisions of the 2006 Directive (2006/43/EC, articles 32 
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and 35). These provisions have become even more critical in light of the 2014 Directive 
(2014/56/EU), which amends the previous one, requiring POAs to be governed by non-
practitioners only, and to be given greater powers through sole responsibility for the 
tasks of inspection, investigation and discipline. Second, all the aforementioned 
characteristics have attracted wide attention in regulatory debates. Specifically, POAs 
have been criticised for being composed largely of members who lack expertise or 
experience in auditing (Palmrose 2006; Glover et al. 2009; CFRR 2014), for being 
granted ‘sweeping powers’ (Simnett and Smith 2005; Palmrose 2006; Glover et al. 
2009), and for providing ineffective feedback (Palmrose 2006; Glover et al. 2009; 
Lennox and Pittman 2010). Indeed, the issue of monitoring by experienced practitioners 
rather than by independent non-practitioners has been one of the longest-standing 
debates in audit regulation (e.g. DeFond 2010). Finally, the choice of the above public 
oversight design features was also driven by practical considerations and data 
availability issues.4 
Audit regulation is an important factor determining audit firms’ behaviour and 
incentives (e.g. DeFond and Zhang 2014). Replacing private self-regulation with 
independent public oversight is a major regime shift, with potentially significant 
consequences for audit pricing and audit quality. Most notably, to the extent that 
national public monitoring bodies have a reputation for being tough regulators, the 
                                                 
4 Another potentially interesting dimension of the new audit regulation system is whether inspection reports are 
made publicly available. However, no EU country discloses inspection reports, with the partial exception of Sweden 
and the UK. In the former, reports are disclosed only for some Big 4 audit firms, while in the latter, reports are 
disclosed annually, but only for major audits. Similarly, the selection process for oversight board members, as well 
as the level and sources of funding of the public oversight system are potentially worth investigating, but it proved 
impossible to obtain good-quality, relevant data for this study. 
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threat of an inspection under the new regime is likely to present audit firms with an ex 
ante incentive to increase their efforts and their investment in audit resources in 
anticipation of inspections (DeFond 2010). However, the effects of alternative public 
oversight design choices on the cost and quality of audits are unclear. 
First, the EC has identified significant participation by non-practitioners as an 
essential characteristic of oversight bodies, with independence being critical to 
maintaining high audit quality and public confidence (EC 2003b). However, of equal 
importance in an oversight regime is the ability of board members to understand the 
practical implications of the audit framework, and to have appropriate knowledge, 
experience and capability (e.g. Simnett and Smith 2005; CFRR 2014). 
Second, according to the EC, ‘public oversight must include the exercise of 
investigative and disciplinary powers’ because ‘without such powers public oversight 
would lack public credibility’ (EC 2003b). Accordingly, oversight authorities should be 
responsible not only for performing their own inspections of audit firms, but also for 
investigating certain cases further, and for imposing penalties if necessary. However, 
an alternative view is that powers should be separated in order to ensure the 
transparency and accountability, and thus the credibility, of the oversight body (e.g. 
Glover et al. 2009). 
Third, the content of inspection reports provided by the public oversight body, and 
particularly the provision of an overall opinion on the quality of the audit firm under 
review, is also of critical importance. On the one hand, some scholars claim that the 
absence of such an evaluative summary may impair the informational value of 
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inspection reports, and in turn the efficiency and effectiveness of the feedback process 
(Lennox and Pittman 2010). On the other hand, provision of an overall rating may result 
in misrepresentative information or even ‘gaming’ behaviour by audit firms, thus 
limiting the effectiveness of the system’s feedback reporting (Christensen et al. 2016). 
This study analyses a large international sample of listed firms from 24 EU 
countries over the period 2005–2013. Using hand-collected information from various 
sources, the study documents significant heterogeneity in the design of public audit 
oversight across the EU. In particular, almost 46 per cent of the sample regulatory 
authorities consist entirely of non-practitioners or provide an overall quality rating in 
their inspection reports, while 79 per cent of public oversight bodies have concentrated 
power. 
In conducting multivariate regression analyses, this study employs audit fees and 
three proxies of audit quality, namely clients’ absolute and signed abnormal accruals 
and the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion. The study reports two main 
results that are new to the literature. First, it documents a significant increase in audit 
fees subsequent to the adoption of public oversight in countries where all members of 
the oversight body are non-practitioners, and in countries where the national audit firm 
regulator has full responsibility for inspection, investigation and discipline. Second, 
unlike audit fees, the study finds no evidence to suggest that the quality of audit 
engagements is affected by various features of the public oversight system. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that many aspects of the new inspection regime are 
largely process- and compliance-driven, with high costs for limited benefits (Boone et 
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al. 2015; Christensen et al. 2016). As a result, the cost of audits increases, especially 
when audit firm oversight is performed by non-practitioners who are potentially more 
independent and objective, or by regulators with higher enforcement power who are 
potentially more efficient, but this is not necessarily accompanied by higher-quality 
audits. Alternatively, the inability to detect any differences in audit quality may be 
attributable to the potentially limited suitability of commonly-used audit quality proxies 
for measuring the amount of assurance provided by audit firms (DeFond and Zhang 
2014). 
Broadly, this study contributes to recent literature on the establishment as well as 
the costs and benefits of the public oversight regime. Archival research using primarily 
US data suggests that audit inspections performed by the PCAOB in the US have 
improved audit quality among small audit firms, but the evidence is less conclusive for 
large US audit firms.5 Qualitative, in-depth country case studies reveal interesting 
dynamics of power between the national regulator, professional accounting bodies and 
audit firms, as well as the system’s dependence on the national socio-political and 
economic context for successful implementation (e.g. Malsch and Gendron 2011; 
Caramanis et al. 2015). 
This study relates most closely to research by Carson et al. (2017) and Boone et 
al. (2015). Based on an international sample of firms from 51 countries between 2003 
and 2012 and using a difference-in-differences design, Carson et al. (2017) document 
                                                 
5 For recent reviews of PCAOB research, see Abernathy et al. (2013) and DeFond and Zhang (2014). For subsequent 
papers, see Gipper et al. (2015) and DeFond and Lennox (2017). 
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higher audit quality in countries where there are periodic inspections under the public 
oversight system in the post-inspection period. However, they provide limited evidence 
that audit quality is associated with various features of the inspection process, such as 
the type and frequency of inspections. Boone et al. (2015) explore a PCAOB 
disciplinary order against Deloitte and find a decrease in Deloitte’s audit fee growth 
rate, but no improvement in its audit quality. Contrary to Carson et al. (2017), the 
current study exploits cross-country heterogeneity in the design of public oversight 
across the EU and analyses the consequences of different external audit monitoring 
systems for audit pricing and audit quality. Similarly to Carson et al. (2017) and Boone 
et al. (2015), it documents an increase in audit costs but no change in audit quality 
associated with certain public oversight design features. 
The current study is believed to be the first to compile three distinct country-level 
measures of audit regulation design and provide evidence regarding their consequences 
for audit pricing and quality, as well as addressing long-standing debate on the relative 
merits of monitoring by experienced practitioners or by independent non-practitioners 
(e.g. DeFond 2010). In doing so, the study advances understanding of the role of public 
oversight design choices and provides a starting point for further research. The findings 
may be of particular relevance to debate on the effectiveness of the current 
organisational models and inspection reporting processes of national audit firm 
regulators, including the PCAOB. Finally, the results are potentially important in light 
of recent developments and new public oversight provisions in the EU (2014/56/EU). 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief 
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overview of the institutional setting and related literature. Section 3.3 elaborates on the 
research design and describes the data. Section 3.4 presents the empirical findings, and 
Section 3.5 draws some conclusions. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Institutional setting 
In 2006, the EU issued a new Directive on statutory audit, requiring member states to 
set up effective systems for the public oversight of auditors and audit firms 
(2006/43/EC). Prior to this, the audit profession in the EU had been regulated by the 
8th EU Council Directive on Company Law, which did not specify any public oversight 
or external quality assurance requirements. Instead, these matters were left to the 
discretion of the appropriate authorities in the member states. The 2006 Directive 
therefore represented a major regime shift, replacing private self-regulation with public 
oversight in several European countries (FEE 2006). 
Under the new 2006 regime, an independent public oversight authority (POA) was 
established in each EU country, responsible for oversight of the approval and 
registration of auditors and audit firms, adoption of standards on auditing and related 
issues, and quality assurance, investigative and disciplinary systems governing audit 
firms (2006/43/EC, article 32(4)). All auditors and audit firms are subject to public 
oversight (2006/43/EC, article 32(2)), with audit quality reviews being required at least 
every six years in general, and every three years for listed firms (2006/43/EC, articles 
29 (1h) and 43). 
The Directive’s provisions stipulate that the scope of an audit inspection should 
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cover primarily assessment of the design of the audit firm’s internal quality control 
systems, adequate compliance testing of its procedures and, in the case of listed firms, 
a review of audit files, a significant proportion of which should be selected using a risk-
based analysis (2008/362/EC, paras. 17 and 19).6 On completion, inspection findings 
should be properly discussed with the inspected audit firm before the inspection report 
is finalised (2008/362/EC, para. 20). The POA also has the right to perform an 
investigation (i.e. a second review) if significant issues are raised during the inspection 
stage or complaints are made by third parties, as well as the right to take disciplinary 
action against inspected auditors or audit firms. Disciplinary measures may vary from 
reprimand to monetary penalties or withdrawal of approval (2006/43/EC, article 32(5); 
FEE, 2006). 
This study focuses on three potentially important dimensions of the public 
oversight system, namely the POA’s membership and concentration of power, and the 
content of its inspection reports. First, it investigates the composition of the POA. The 
Directive requires that the majority of members of the POA should be non-practitioners 
who have never been linked with the audit profession or former practitioners who have 
left the profession.7 However, member states may allow a minority of practitioners to 
be involved in governance of the national public oversight system (2006/43/EC, article 
32(3)). 
                                                 
6 The terms ‘inspection’ and ‘quality assurance reviews’ are used interchangeably in the 2006 Directive and related 
documents. 
7 Article 2(15) of the Directive states that ‘non-practitioner’ means any natural person who, for at least three years 
before his or her involvement in the governance of the public oversight system, has not carried out statutory audits, 
has not held voting rights in an audit firm, has not been a member of the administrative or management body of an 
audit firm and has not been employed by, or otherwise associated with, an audit firm. 
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Second, the study assesses the POA’s concentration of power based on the extent 
to which it is responsible for performing the three tasks of inspection, investigation and 
discipline. As previously discussed, enforcement of quality assurance reviews and 
disciplinary sanctions generally remains in the hands of the new POA, which is 
responsible, either directly or through oversight, for work undertaken by national 
professional bodies. However, member states have the right to delegate some of these 
functions to other competent authorities (2006/43/EC, article 35). 
Third, the study evaluates the content of POA inspection reports, based on their 
inclusion of overall ratings for inspected audit firms. The Directive does not mandate 
the provision of an evaluative summary of the overall level of quality of an audit firm, 
which is left to the discretion of member states. Finally, Article 53 of the 2006 Directive 
prescribes that the new provisions should be adopted by all member states within two 
years of the issuance of the Directive. 
3.2.2 Theory and related literature 
The previous literature acknowledges the role of regulation in shaping the incentives of 
audit firms (Francis 2011; Knechel et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Audit firm 
transgressions may have severe consequences for both auditors and audit firms, 
including the loss of licences to practice for the former, and high regulatory, litigation 
and reputational costs for the latter (Francis 2011). 
Audit fees are the sum of an audit firm’s effort cost and expected legal liability 
costs (e.g. Simunic 1980; Lyon and Maher 2005; Choi et al. 2008). Audit effort cost is 
a function of the total hours spent on engagements and the cost per hour. Audit quality 
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is variously defined in the literature (e.g. Knechel et al. 2013; DeFond and Zhang, 2014; 
DeFond, Lim and Zang, 2016). A widely-used definition by DeAngelo (1981) states 
that audit quality is ‘the market assessed joint probability that a given auditor will both 
discover a breach in a client’s accounting system, and report the breach’. Based on this 
definition, audit quality is broken down into two components: (1) the likelihood that an 
auditor will discover a breach in the client’s statements and (2) the probability that the 
auditor will report that breach. 
Given the role of regulation in shaping auditors’ incentives, the new public 
oversight system is likely to affect the behaviour of individual auditors and audit firms 
which, in turn, may affect audit pricing and audit quality. However, alternative design 
choices may have different effects. 
First, the dual models of POA structure, i.e. non-practitioners versus practitioners, 
represent the classical trade-off between independence and expertise (DeFond 2010, 
2012; DeFond and Zhang 2014). On the one hand, if the POA consists entirely of non-
practitioners who are generally more objective, low-quality auditors and audit firms are 
more likely to receive unfavourable inspection reports from ‘unfriendly’ reviewers who 
are not their peers (Fogarty 1996; Grumet 2005; Anantharaman 2012). This possibility 
potentially improves the quality of the reviewing process, leading to an expectation of 
higher audit fees and enhanced audit quality. Specifically, in order to avoid 
unfavourable inspection reports by the POA, auditors are likely to spend more time on 
gathering sufficient evidence and performing additional controls. The audit firm may 
also employ a higher-quality engagement team, resulting in increased hourly rates. 
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Therefore, a more independent POA may increase audit effort cost by increasing either 
the total engagement hours or the hourly rate charged. A more independent POA may 
also increase expected legal liability costs. As previously discussed, when the POA is 
more independent or the reviewers are ‘unfriendly’, audit firms are more likely to 
receive unfavourable inspection reports, and are thus more likely to face fines and other 
monetary penalties. Based on the above discussion, audit fees are expected to increase 
when the POA consists solely of non-practitioners. 
Furthermore, a POA consisting of members unconnected with the accounting 
profession may improve audit quality by affecting either or both of its two components, 
namely the likelihood that an auditor will discover a breach in the statements, and the 
probability that the auditor will report that breach. In particular, if POA members are 
more strong-minded, and ‘unfriendly’ reviewers are more likely to issue unfavourable 
reports, audit firms are likely to react by supplying higher-quality auditing services to 
avoid such reports. In order to do so, audit firms are more likely to put more inputs and 
expertise into audit engagements, which will increase their competence, thereby 
enhancing the likelihood of discovering breaches in clients’ statements. Moreover, more 
independent or ‘unfriendly’ reviewers may be less likely to tolerate audit firms’ defects 
or errors, thus increasing their likelihood of reporting any misstatements. 
On the other hand, the participation of non-practitioners in the POA may impair 
the review process owing to a lack of expertise and experience. In other words, non-
practitioners may lack industry expertise, up-to-date technical knowledge and wide 
experience across different areas (Simnett and Smith 2005; Palmrose 2006; Glover et 
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al. 2009; DeFond 2010). Auditing is a highly technical, non-routinised activity. For 
example, experts in financial derivatives may focus on a sub-set of specialist 
transactions, as it is almost a full-time job to remain up-to-date on the application of 
standards to such complex transactions. Similarly, IT audit experts must continually 
update their skills for new technologies. As a result of concerns about the POA’s lack 
of expertise, there may be no effect on either the cost or quality of audits; in fact, audit 
fees may reduce and audit quality may deteriorate. 
In particular, auditor oversight by non-practitioners may decrease their probability 
of identifying audit deficiencies, thereby reducing their likelihood of issuing an 
unfavourable report. In such cases, expected legal liability costs and/or audit effort cost 
will be unaffected (or may even decrease). Furthermore, as the probability of receiving 
an unfavourable report reduces, auditors’ incentives to supply higher-quality audits may 
be weakened, reducing the probability of detecting or reporting clients’ misstatements. 
Given the above competing arguments regarding the effects of POA membership 
on audit pricing and audit quality, the first research question is formulated as follows: 
RQ1: How does POA membership affect audit fees and audit quality? 
The second design characteristic is the concentration of all three functions of inspection, 
investigation and discipline in a single oversight authority, either directly or indirectly 
via collaboration with professional bodies. This may enhance the POA’s enforcement 
powers, thus improving the efficiency of the overall quality assurance system (Gunny 
and Zhang 2013). 
Improved efficiency may increase the possibility of detecting and penalising 
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auditing deficiencies. Consequently, audit firms will be more likely to receive 
unfavourable inspection reports, thus increasing expected legal liability costs. At the 
same time, in order to avoid unfavourable reports, auditors will be likely to allocate 
more time and expertise (more audit hours and cost per hour), which will increase audit 
effort cost, and hence audit fees. In addition, audit firms will be more likely to supply 
higher-quality audits if they know that the oversight system is more efficient in 
detecting and penalising audit deficiencies. Similarly, audit firms are more likely to 
report any financial misstatements when faced with a powerful POA. Overall, audit 
quality is likely to improve. 
However, high levels of power concentration may limit the accountability and 
transparency of the oversight body owing to fewer ‘checks and balances’ (Campbell 
and Houghton 2005; Glover et al. 2009), potentially reducing the rigour of audit 
scrutiny. As a result of this concern, the benefits of an efficient POA may be eroded, 
and it may have a negative or no impact on audit fees and audit quality. Therefore, the 
second research question is as follows: 
RQ2: How does POA power concentration affect audit fees and audit quality? 
Third, providing an overall opinion on the quality of the inspected audit firm may 
enhance the informational content of the inspection report, enabling prospective clients 
to distinguish between high- and low-quality audit firms (Lennox and Pittman 2010). 
Favourable inspection reports may bolster audit firms’ reputation and market share, 
whereas unfavourable reports may increase their reputational losses and litigation 
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costs.8 Therefore, owing to concern for their reputation and associated losses, audit 
firms may devote more time and expertise (more audit hours and cost per hour) to the 
auditing process in order to obtain favourable inspection reports. As the cost of the audit 
effort increases, audit fees may be pushed up. 
With regard to audit quality, as a result of concern for reputation, disclosure of an 
overall quality rating in the report may motivate the audit firm to supply high-quality 
audits in order to gain a favourable report. As a result, more inputs and greater expertise 
may be devoted to audit engagements, and audit firms’ competence is likely to increase. 
In this case, the likelihood of audit firms discovering clients’ misstatements may 
increase. Also, in order to receive favourable reports and avoid reputational damage 
and associated losses, audit firms may be less likely to hide clients’ misstatements; 
otherwise, they risk their misconduct being detected by the POA, leading to the issuance 
of unfavourable reports. 
However, owing to the multidimensional nature of audit quality, a single rating 
measure may provide misleading information. For example, the PCAOB cautions 
against judging the quality of an audit firm solely on the number of deficiencies 
identified in its inspection report (Christensen et al. 2016). Related to this, consolidated 
measures across different inputs (i.e. specific areas of audit work) may motivate 
‘gaming’ behaviour by audit firms (e.g. ‘meet or beat’ behaviour). In either case, the 
informational usefulness of an aggregate rating is potentially limited. Therefore, the 
                                                 
8 This is still the case even if POA inspection reports are not publicly disclosed, because prospective clients are 
likely to engage in private communications with audit firms regarding their inspections. Moreover, in the event of a 
favourable inspection outcome, audit firms are likely to provide the reports to potential clients voluntarily. 
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benefits of disclosing an overall quality rating may be impaired, and it may have a 
negative or no impact on audit fees and audit quality. Based on the above, the third 
research question for this study is formulated as follows: 
RQ3: How does the disclosure of an overall inspection rating affect audit fees and 
audit quality? 
In summary, if public oversight bodies consisting only of non-practitioners, with 
concentrated power and the ability to provide an overall rating, are viewed as tougher 
audit firm regulators, then one would expect to observe higher audit fees and enhanced 
audit quality as a result of increased audit effort, greater investment in audit resources 
and higher audit risk. However, since non-practitioners are regarded as less 
knowledgeable, oversight bodies with concentrated power as less transparent and the 
provision of a summary score as of limited use, this study does not expect any 
association between the above public oversight features and audit pricing or quality. 
Finally, differences in the design of the new public oversight systems are likely to 
relate to the costs of audits, but not necessarily to their quality, for at least four reasons. 
First, POA inspections may focus on compliance and procedures rather than on a 
holistic assessment of the quality of the audit engagement (Beattie, Fearnley, and Hines 
2013; Christensen et al. 2016), or they may even be conducted as ‘desk reviews’ 
performed at the POA’s offices (Gunny and Zhang 2013; Boone et al. 2015). Second, 
the new monitoring regime in the EU is potentially time-consuming and costly for audit 
firms, given that they become involved in discussions of the findings with the inspectors 
before completion of the inspection report (2008/362/EC, para. 20); this is consistent 
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with the notion of audit firms’ response to inspection risk (Christensen et al. 2016). 
Third, given the risk-based approach followed during POA inspections, the sample of 
engagements selected for inspection is unlikely to be representative, and therefore the 
average quality of audit engagements will be unaffected (DeFond 2010; Gunny and 
Zhang 2013; Christensen et al. 2016). Fourth, even without more extensive or tougher 
regulations, audit firms may still have incentives to behave in a professional manner at 
partner and firm levels owing to reputational and legal concerns. In this case, whether 
or not the POA is tougher may not be significantly associated with the quality of 
auditing activities. In line with these arguments, Gunny and Zhang (2013) find that 
PCAOB inspection outcomes are not associated with audit quality for annually-
inspected audit firms, while Boone et al. (2015) document a decrease in Deloitte’s audit 
fees but no change in its audit quality following its public censure by the PCAOB. 
3.3 Research design and data 
3.3.1 Sample selection 
The sample period was from 2005 to 2013.9 The initial sample included all domiciled 
listed firms in the 28 EU member states, as well as Iceland and Norway because they 
belong to the European Economic Area (EEA) and adopt all EU directives.10 Firms 
                                                 
9 The post-2005 period was used in order to avoid contamination of the findings by the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
in the EU in 2005. Specifically, previous literature documents significant changes in financial reporting quality and 
audit costs associated with the switch from local GAAP to IFRS (for a recent comprehensive review, see De George, 
Li, and Shivakumar 2016). Accordingly, by focusing on the post-IFRS period, the study holds the financial reporting 
regime constant; therefore, any observed changes in the outcome variables (e.g. audit fees) are unlikely to be driven 
by changes in financial reporting standards. An alternative research design might focus only on the period following 
the establishment of POAs and examine the implications of cross-country heterogeneity in POA design features for 
audit pricing and audit quality. However, the drawback of this approach is the lack of time-series heterogeneity in 
the variables of interest, and therefore inability to include country-fixed effects, which is critical given the cross-
country nature of the study. 
10 Article 34 of the 2006 Directive specifies that firms are subject to the public oversight requirements of the country 
in which they are domiciled (‘home-country’). Hence, cross-listed/non-domiciled firms were excluded from each 
country. Worldscope’s nationcode items (code WS06027), as well as ISIN codes, were used to determine domicile. 
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trading on unregulated EU markets (e.g. the Alternative Investment Market in London) 
were then eliminated, as EU directives do not necessarily apply to these. In line with 
previous literature (e.g. Michas 2011; Francis, Michas, and Seavey 2013), firms from 
the financial sector were also excluded from the sample, as their financial information 
is not comparable with that of other firms.11 Finally, six countries (Croatia, Cyprus, 
Estonia, Latvia, Malta and Romania) were deleted from the sample as the required POA 
country-level data could not be obtained. This left 24 countries that formed the basis of 
the sample. The final sample included all observations for which the necessary firm-
level data were available for regression analysis. 
Table 3.1 describes the sample-screening process. The final sample comprised 
13,482 observations for the audit fees analysis, 23,487 firm-year observations for the 
abnormal accruals analysis, and 23,895 observations for the audit opinion analysis. 
Table 3.2 provides an overview of the sample composition by country (Panel A) and by 
year (Panel B) for all analyses. As expected, country sample sizes varied significantly. 
For example, the number of observations was limited for several countries such as 
Bulgaria, Iceland and Lithuania, whereas France, Germany and the UK dominated the 
sample in all three analyses.12 Finally, the sample was evenly spread across the 2005–
2013 period. 
 
                                                 
11 Firms trading on unregulated markets were identified using information from the stock exchange website of each 
country. 
12  In the primary empirical analysis, all countries were retained in order to identify significant cross-country 
variations in public oversight design features. However, as discussed in Section 3.4, the robustness of the findings 
was assessed, resulting in the exclusion of both small and large countries. 
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Table 3.1 Sample selection process 
 Observations 




Total assets, sales or market value of equity zero 
Firms with fiscal-year changes 
(2,193) 
(460) 
Firms listed on unregulated markets (13,980) 
Firms from the financial sector 
Firms from countries without necessary POA data 
(8,052) 
(1,557) 
Total sample 30,138 
Firms without necessary firm-level data (16,656) 
Final sample for audit fees analysis 13,482 
  
Total sample 30,138 
Firms without necessary firm-level data (6,651) 
Final sample for abnormal accruals analysis 23,487 
  
Total sample 30,138 
Firms without necessary firm-level data (6,243) 






Table 3.2 Sample composition 
Panel A: By country 
Country Audit Fees Abnormal Accruals Audit Opinion 
 N % N % N % 
Austria  182 1.35 436 1.86 449 1.88 
Belgium  376 2.79 703 2.99 721 3.02 
Bulgaria 2 0.01 201 0.86 136 0.57 
Czech Republic 19 0.14 81 0.34 85 0.36 
Denmark  545 4.04 839 3.57 841 3.52 
Finland  655 4.86 1,023 4.36 993 4.16 
France  1,954 14.49 3,352 14.27 3,322 13.90 
Germany  1,993 14.78 3,162 13.46 3,277 13.71 
Greece  40 0.30 1,287 5.48 1,367 5.72 
Hungary 14 0.10 65 0.28 64 0.27 
Iceland 36 0.27 59 0.25 64 0.27 
Ireland  268 1.99 299 1.27 310 1.30 
Italy  877 6.50 1,730 7.37 1,627 6.81 
Lithuania 1 0.01 158 0.67 191 0.80 
Luxembourg 40 0.30 110 0.47 114 0.48 
Netherlands  421 3.12 883 3.76 874 3.66 
Norway  344 2.55 542 2.31 568 2.38 
Poland 422 3.13 1,593 6.78 1,679 7.03 
Portugal  160 1.19 354 1.51 352 1.47 
Slovakia 7 0.05 44 0.19 50 0.21 
Slovenia 19 0.14 67 0.29 71 0.30 
Spain  564 4.18 659 2.81 725 3.03 
Sweden  1,210 8.97 2,156 9.18 2,272 9.51 
UK  3,333 24.72 3,684 15.69 3,743 15.66 
Total 13,482 100 23,487 100 23,895 100 
Panel B: By year 
Year Audit Fees Abnormal Accruals Audit Opinion 
 N % N % N % 
2005 1,207 8.95 2,409 10.26 2,743 11.48 
2006 1,322 9.81 2,685 11.43 2,785 11.66 
2007  1,401 10.39 2,815 11.99 2,819 11.80 
2008  1,490 11.05 2,793 11.89 2,809 11.76 
2009 1,555 11.53 2,743 11.68 2,805 11.74 
2010  1,684 12.49 2,696 11.49 2,743 11.48 
2011 1,759 13.05 2,599 11.07 2,644 11.07 
2012 1,602 11.88 2,449 10.43 2,406 10.07 
2013 1,462 10.84 2,298 9.78 2,141 8.96 
Total 13,482 100 23,487 100 23,895 100 
Notes: The sample period is 2005–2013. The sample comprises 24 countries. 
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3.3.2 Public oversight authority variables 
POA variables were constructed for the sample countries as follows. MEMBERSHIP 
refers to POA composition, and in particular to firms in countries where all POA board 
members are non-practitioners. POWER refers to the power concentration of the POA, 
and more specifically to firms in countries where the POA is responsible for all three 
functions of inspection, investigation and discipline. RATING refers to the content of 
inspection reports, and in particular to firms in countries where inspection reports 
provide overall ratings of the audit firms under review. Each POA variable is a dummy 
indicator that equals 1 for all firm-year observations ending on or after the national law 
of public oversight became effective, and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the variables of 
interest capture changes in audit fees or audit quality for firms in countries with a POA 
that consists only of non-practitioners (MEMBERSHIP) or has concentrated power 
(POWER) or provides a summary inspection score (RATING) following the adoption 
of public oversight, relative to corresponding changes for firms in countries without the 
above POA designs. All variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
To construct the test variables, information was hand-collected from a variety of 
sources. In particular, data for MEMBERSHIP were drawn primarily from the profiles 
of member states provided by the website of the International Forum of Independent 
Audit Regulators (IFIAR), a well-known international body whose members are audit 
oversight authorities from around the world (IFIAR 2013). Since these data were 
sourced directly from the oversight bodies, the reliability of the data was considered to 
be high. In addition, in cases of ambiguity, the IFIAR data were supplemented or cross-
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checked using the biographies of POA members available through LinkedIn and 
national POAs’ websites or by contacting the POAs directly. For POWER, the primary 
sources of data were the IFIAR’s (2013) member profiles and an EC report containing 
information provided by member states on competent oversight authorities (EC 2010). 
With regard to RATING, POAs’ annual reports available on their websites were 
manually checked, and the national POAs were contacted directly in the event that the 
annual reports were uninformative.13 Finally, a combination of the above sources was 
used to identify national laws that incorporate the 2006 Directive and the years in which 
they became effective. Appendix 2 reports the data sources for construction of the POA 
variables. 
Appendix 3 describes the public oversight systems across the sample countries, 
and Table 3.3 Panel A presents the coding of the POA variables, based on information 
reported in Appendix 3, as well as the country-level institutional and economic control 
variables used in the study. There is wide variation in the external audit regulation 
systems across the sample countries studied. First, 11 countries (45.8 per cent of 
sample), including Germany, Greece, Netherlands and the UK, have a POA consisting 
entirely of non-practitioners. 
 
                                                 
13 IFIAR’s website provides only the most recent profiles of member states (see https://www.ifiar.org). At the time 
of the initial data collection, 2013 profiles were available; subsequently, the Czech Republic and Slovenia were 
included using their first available profiles for 2014. Therefore, it was assumed that the POA variables remained 
constant following the implementation of the 2006 Directive. Arguably, audit oversight characteristics, like most 
institutional arrangements, tend to be static and experience only minor changes over long periods of time. To provide 
some related evidence, the national POAs were contacted again to request information regarding their rating systems 
over the sample period. None of the national regulators in the dataset had made any changes to their rating processes 
following the establishment of their POAs. Member profiles are available on request from the authors. All 
correspondence with POAs, with a few exceptions, is also available on request from the authors. 
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Table 3.3 Country-level descriptive statistics 
Panel A: POA, economic and institutional characteristics by country 
Country MEMBERSHIP POWER RATING GDP GDP_PER_CAP HHI RULE 
Austria  1 0 1 391 46,714.30 0.481 1.859 
Belgium  1 0 1 479 44,194.04 0.327 1.333 
Bulgaria 0 1 1 46.80 6,295.53 0.404 -0.127 
Czech Republic 0 1 0 197 18,899.37 0.778 0.922 
Denmark  1 0 0 318 57,539.58 0.743 1.928 
Finland  0 1 0 251 46,918.22 0.374 1.943 
France  0 0 0 2,640 40,889.12 0.451 1.440 
Germany  1 1 0 3,430 41,989.77 0.348 1.667 
Greece  1 1 0 290 25,987.96 0.570 0.658 
Hungary 0 1 1 131 13,103.20 0.544 0.779 
Iceland 0 1 1 15.90 50,755.63 0.532 1.778 
Ireland  0 1 1 236 52,992.16 0.293 1.711 
Italy  1 1 0 2,140 36,229.70 0.528 0.393 
Lithuania 0 1 1 38.70 12,400.88 0.111 0.711 
Luxembourg 1 1 0 51.20 101,892.60 0.461 1.786 
Netherlands  1 1 1 824 49,822.62 0.771 1.789 
Norway  1 1 0 422 86,841.32 0.615 1.929 
Poland 0 1 0 452 11,799.26 0.710 0.576 
Portugal  0 1 1 231 21,940.38 0.415 1.035 
Slovakia 0 1 1 87.20 16,174.65 0.361 0.506 
Slovenia 1 1 0 47.00 23,114.48 0.658 0.959 
Spain  0 1 0 1,410 30,797.48 0.754 1.111 
Sweden  0 1 0 491 52,650.43 0.401 1.908 
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UK  1 0 1 2,590 41,680.91 0.459 1.683 
Mean 0.458 0.792 0.458 717.00 38,817.65 0.504 1.262 
Panel B: Correlations between POA and other country-level variables (n=24) 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 MEMBERSHIP - -0.352* -0.175 0.344* 0.429** 0.211 0.260 
2 POWER -0.352* - -0.146 -0.393* -0.230 0.067 -0.289 
3 RATING -0.175 -0.146 - -0.332 -0.187 -0.381* -0.139 
4 GDP 0.305 -0.374* -0.313 - 0.218 0.103 0.224 
5 GDP_PER_CAP 0.477** -0.167 -0.262 0.110 - 0.018 0.877*** 
6 HHI 0.208 0.036 -0.419** 0.161 0.043 - 0.029 
7 RULE 0.297 -0.335 -0.116 0.224 0.785*** 0.034 - 
Notes: Panel A presents the design features of the POA and other economic and institutional variables for the sample countries. See Appendix 1 for definitions of all variables. 
Each POA variable equals 1 for all observations ending on or after the national law of public oversight became effective, and 0 otherwise. GDP is reported in billion US$. The 
values of all variables are mean values across all sample years for each country. Panel B reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations across the bottom (top) of the table. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). All variables are averaged within each country over all sample years prior to calculating 
the correlations. Correlations are based on the natural log of GDP. 
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Second, in most sample countries (79.2 per cent of the sample), the POA has a high 
concentration of power, being responsible for all three functions of inspection, 
investigation and discipline. In contrast, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France and the 
UK delegate some of these functions to separate bodies. Third, inspection reports 
provide overall opinions on the level of audit firms’ quality in 11 of the sample countries 
(45.8 per cent of sample). The rating scales vary from country to country, such as A, B, 
C and D in Ireland, and ‘satisfactory’, ‘satisfactory with comments’ and ‘unsatisfactory’ 
in Austria. Finally, a few countries had adopted the public oversight system before the 
issuance of the 2006 Directive – for example, Germany and the UK had introduced new 
audit regulation regimes in 2005 and 2004 respectively – but the vast majority of sample 
countries implemented public oversight at some point during the post-2006 period. The 
considerable cross-country and time-series heterogeneity in the adoption of public 
oversight systems (see Appendix 3) was explored through empirical tests. 
Table 3.3 Panel B reports pairwise Pearson and Spearman country-level 
correlations (n=24) between the POA and the other country-level control variables used 
in the regression analyses. The following observations are noteworthy. First, there are 
no high correlations between the POA variables, suggesting that the three dimensions 
do not cluster. Second, the POA variables and the country controls employed in the 
study do not display systematically high correlations. Thus, the POA variables appear 
to be distinct measures of a country’s audit oversight system, separate from more 
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general features of market size, wealth, economic growth and legal environment.14 
Third, as expected, rule of law and per capita GDP are significantly positively 
correlated. 
3.3.3 Empirical models 
Audit fees 
To examine the relationship between audit costs and public oversight design choices, 
the following audit fee model was employed, in line with previous studies (e.g. Simunic 
1980; Choi et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2012; Carcello and Li 2013; Boone et al. 2015): 
AUDFEE = 0  + 1 MEMBERSHIP + 2 POWER + 3 RATING   
             + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
15
𝑗=1 FIRM-SPECIFIC CONTROLS  
             +∑ 𝛿𝜅
3
𝑘=1  COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONTROLS+ε   (1) 
AUDFEE is measured as the log of audit fees in thousands of US$. In line with previous 
international studies of audit fees (e.g. Choi et al. 2008, 2009; Kim et al. 2012), 
Worldscope data were used. It must be noted that Worldscope audit fee data may also 
include non-audit fees paid to audit firms, so the extent to which this creates noise in 
the dependent variable may reduce the power of the tests. 
Coefficient estimates β1 to β3 capture the effects on audit fees of heterogeneity in 
audit firm supervision across the EU. The model includes 15 firm-specific controls: 
firm size (SIZE), profitability (LOSS and ROA), leverage (LEVERAGE), book-to-
market ratio (BM), cash flow from operations (CFO), busy audit period (BUSY), 
                                                 
14  A few correlations between the POA variables and country-level factors (e.g. MEMBERSHIP and 
GDP_PER_CAP) are statistically significant; however, all correlations are less than 0.50. 
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whether the firm is in a litigious industry (LITIGIOUS), the likelihood of the firm 
receiving a qualified opinion (OPINION), liquidity (LIQUIDITY), whether the audit 
firm is a Big 4 audit firm (BIG4), the number of business segments (NBS), the number 
of geographical segments (NGS), the proportion of foreign sales (FORSALES) and the 
intensity of receivables and inventory (INVREC). All variables are time-variant, with 
the exception of BIG4.15 
With regard to cross-country differences that may affect audit fees, and in line with 
previous international research (Choi et al. 2008, 2009; Numan and Willekens 2012), 
the model includes the Herfindahl index (HHI) to control for the impact of audit market 
concentration, as well as gross domestic product (GDP) and gross domestic product per 
capita (GDP_PER_CAP) to capture differences in living standards and therefore the 
reservation compensation for audit firms. All country-level factors are time-variant. 
Data on GDP and GDP_PER_CAP were obtained from the World Bank, and the data 
required to compute HHI were collected from Worldscope. 
As the test variables are time-variant, capturing both changes in the public 
oversight regime over time and differences between different types of regime in the 
cross-section, the models (i.e. audit fees and audit quality) include country-fixed effects 
to control for unobserved country-level characteristics that may affect the results for 
the POA variables. Focusing only on country-years with a public oversight regime in 
place would result in time-invariant POA variables, and thus would not allow the 
inclusion of country-fixed effects, which is critical given the cross-country nature of 
                                                 
15 Worldscope provides only the current audit firm(s) employed by a company. 
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the study. In other words, any documented empirical findings might be attributable to 
unobserved country-level characteristics potentially associated with the study’s 
outcome variables. 
Moreover, several previous related studies adopt the same research design, 
employing pre- and post-settings (e.g. Carson et al. 2017; Lamoreaux 2016; Aobdia and 
Schroff 2017). For example, Carson et al. (2017) generate a dummy variable 
(Inspection) to reflect the change in the inspection system; they then interact this 
indicator with the inspection characteristics of interest (e.g. frequency of inspections). 
Similarly, Lamoreaux (2016) generates an indicator (POST) to reflect the post-PCAOB 
inspection period, and interacts it with several variables that capture the national 
regulator presence (e.g. whether the regulator is an IFIAR member). Finally, Aobdia 
and Schroff (2017) also interact their test variable (REPORT, equal to 1 if an inspection 
report is released by the PCAOB in the post-PCAOB period) with some local regulator 
characteristics (e.g. IFIAR membership). It is important to note that all the above 
studies employ country-fixed effects. 
Audit quality 
Audit quality is not directly observable, and is a multifaceted construct that cannot be 
represented by a single variable (Christensen et al. 2016). Therefore, to provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the effect of public oversight design on audit quality, 
the study employs three different proxies with potential complementarities (for a recent 
and comprehensive review of alternative audit quality proxies, see DeFond and Zhang 
2014). First, it uses two commonly adopted statistical properties of the accruals 
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component of audited earnings, consistent with audit quality being a continuous 
construct. These properties are absolute abnormal accruals and signed abnormal 
accruals. The likelihood of the audit firm issuing a qualified audit opinion is also used, 
which is a direct outcome of the audit process. Audit quality is higher if clients have 
lower accruals and are more likely to receive a qualified audit opinion. 
The following model is used to test the association between abnormal accruals and 
POA design characteristics: 
AWCA = 0 + 1 MEMBERSHIP + 2 POWER + 3 RATING   
           + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
11
𝑗=1 FIRM-SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
           + ∑ 𝛿𝑘
3
𝑘=1  COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONTROLS + ε   (2) 
DeFond and Park’s (2001) abnormal working capital accruals (AWCA) measure is used, 
which has been adopted in previous audit research (e.g. Carey and Simnett 2006; 
Francis and Wang 2008). AWCA is the difference between actual and expected working 
capital, where the historical relationship between past working capital and sales 
captures expected working capital. AWCA is calculated as AWCA = WCt – [(WCt-1/St-
1)*St], where WC = (current assets – cash and short-term investments) – (current 
liabilities – short term debt), and S = sales. 
This measure is adopted for three main reasons. First, it avoids the estimation 
problems associated with more sophisticated models (Jones 1991), which are 
potentially less reliable for calculating abnormal accruals with international data owing 
to the small number of industry observations per country (Wysocki 2004; Francis and 
Wang 2008; Peek et al. 2013). Second, this measure provides a more powerful test than 
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tests using total accruals (DeFond and Park 2001). Third, previous research suggests 
that managers have most discretion over working capital accruals (Becker et al. 1998; 
Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew 2003). Both absolute AWCA and signed AWCA are 
employed as the dependent variables in Equation (2). Coefficient estimates β1 to β3 
capture the effects of heterogeneity in public oversight systems across the EU on 
abnormal working capital accruals. 
Following previous research (e.g. Michas 2011; Dao, Raghunandan, and Rama 
2012; Lennox and Li 2012; Carcello and Li 2013; Boone et al. 2015), in addition to 
SIZE, LOSS, LEVERAGE, BM, CFO, BUSY, LITIGIOUS and BIG4, the model also 
controls for lagged accruals (LAGGED_ACCRUALS), sales growth (SALES_GROWTH) 
and firm age (AGE), as well as for cross-country differences that may affect audit 
quality. Specifically, in line with previous international studies (Francis and Wang 2008; 
Michas 2011; Francis et al. 2013), the model includes GDP and GDP_PER_CAP to 
control for country size and wealth respectively, and RULE to capture the impact of a 
country’s legal enforcement. Data on RULE were obtained from Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2009). 
The third proxy for audit quality is the likelihood of the audit firm issuing a 
qualified audit opinion (Michas 2011; Lennox and Li 2012; Carcello and Li 2013). In 
this case, the following logistic regression model is employed: 
OPINION = 0 + 1 MEMBERSHIP + 2 POWER + 3 RATING 
+ ∑ 𝛾𝑗
11
𝑗=1 FIRM-SPECIFIC CONTROLS 
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑘
3
𝑘=1  COUNTRY-SPECIFIC CONTROLS + ε   (3) 
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OPINION is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm issues a qualified audit opinion, 
and 0 otherwise.16 Coefficient estimates β1 to β3 reflect the effects of variation in public 
audit oversight across the EU on the propensity of an audit firm to issue a qualified 
audit opinion. Firm-specific controls include SIZE, ROA, LOSS, LEVERAGE, BM, CFO, 
AGE, BUSY, BIG4, LITIGIOUS and LIQUIDITY. Country-level factors are the same as 
in Equation (2). 
All models include industry year-fixed effects and country-fixed effects to control 
for any industry time trends and unobservable country-specific effects respectively. 
Empirical specifications are estimated with White standard errors clustered at the 
country-year level, as this is the level at which the variables of interest are calculated.17 
Continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Table 3.4 describes the firm-level variables used in the regression analyses. Panels 
A, B and C report the distributional properties of all variables in the audit fee, abnormal 




                                                 
16 The Worldscope database does not code the different types of qualified opinions issued. Therefore, similarly to 
previous studies (e.g. Michas 2011), it is impossible to ascertain whether a company’s qualified opinion is due to 
going concern problems or less important issues such as accounting method changes. Also, the relatively low 
frequency of qualified opinions may reduce the statistical power of tests using large samples of firms (DeFond and 
Zhang 2014). 
17  Alternatively, the model replaces industry year-fixed effects with separate industry indicators and a binary 
variable that equals 1 for all firm-year observations ending on or after the national law of public oversight became 
effective, and 0 otherwise; the main inferences remain qualitatively unchanged. Also, one-way clustering at country-
year level is employed (i.e. the clustering unit is every year in a given country). Given the relatively short period (9 
year clusters) and the number of country clusters, which may be as low as 17 (depending on the estimated model), 
two-way clustering by country and by year may be subject to the ‘small cluster’ problem, leading to biased standard 
errors (Petersen 2009, p.460). 
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Table 3.4 Firm-level descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Audit fees sample (N=13,482) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
AUDFEE_RAW 3118.212 709.101 7614.199 
AUDFEE 6.710 6.564 1.565 
SIZE 13.479 13.257 2.026 
LOSS 0.218 0.000 0.413 
LEVERAGE 0.153 0.124 0.145 
BM 0.751 0.571 0.689 
CFO 0.073 0.076 0.098 
BIG4 0.874 1.000 0.332 
BUSY 0.782 1.000 0.413 
LITIGIOUS 0.234 0.000 0.423 
LIQUIDITY 1.660 1.376 1.114 
ROA 0.023 0.039 0.117 
NBS 1.241 1.386 0.525 
NGS 1.449 1.386 0.509 
FORSALES 0.471 0.480 0.321 
INVREC 0.336 0.326 0.184 
OPINION 0.008 0.000 0.087 
Panel B: Abnormal accruals sample (N=23,487) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
|AWCA| 0.062 0.033 0.090 
AWCA -0.001 -0.001 0.097 
SIZE 12.867 12.667 2.109 
LOSS 0.256 0.000 0.436 
LEVERAGE 0.146 0.110 0.147 
BM 0.820 0.602 0.859 
CFO 0.059 0.067 0.113 
BIG4 0.782 1.000 0.413 
BUSY 0.824 1.000 0.381 
LITIGIOUS 0.228 0.000 0.420 
AGE 2.452 2.565 0.821 
LAGGED_ACCRUALS -0.042 -0.040 0.102 




Panel C: Audit opinion sample (N=23,895) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
OPINION 0.009 0.000 0.093 
SIZE 12.815 12.630 2.133 
LOSS 0.256 0.000 0.436 
LEVERAGE 0.145 0.108 0.147 
BM 0.811 0.595 0.828 
CFO 0.056 0.067 0.119 
BIG4 0.781 1.000 0.414 
BUSY 0.822 1.000 0.382 
LITIGIOUS 0.229 0.000 0.420 
AGE 2.425 2.485 0.845 
LIQUIDITY 1.745 1.372 1.395 
ROA 0.008 0.034 0.145 
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Panel D: Dependent variables by country 
Country AUDFEE |AWCA| AWCA OPINION 
 Mean N Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Austria  6.082 182 0.049 436 0.002 436 0.000 449 
Belgium  6.450  376 0.055 703 -0.002 703 0.025 721 
Bulgaria 3.814 2 0.111 201 0.000 201 0.052 136 
Czech Republic 6.477 19 0.061 81 -0.002 81 0.000 85 
Denmark  6.561 545 0.066 839 -0.002 839 0.002 841 
Finland  6.512 655 0.055 1,023 -0.003 1,023 0.000 993 
France  7.053 1,954 0.050 3,352 -0.002 3,352 0.002 3,322 
Germany  6.561 1,993 0.074 3,162 0.001 3,162 0.002 3,277 
Greece  5.554 40 0.063 1,287 -0.006 1,287 0.007 1,367 
Hungary 7.131 14 0.054 65 -0.005 65 0.016 64 
Iceland 7.189 36 0.061 59 -0.007 59 0.000 64 
Ireland  6.661 268 0.060 299 0.003 299 0.090 310 
Italy  6.358 877 0.050 1,730 -0.008 1,730 0.009 1,627 
Lithuania 4.006 1 0.079 158 0.009 158 0.115 191 
Luxembourg 8.066 40 0.058 110 0.002 110 0.009 114 
Netherlands  7.538 421 0.061 883 -0.007 883 0.001 874 
Norway  6.801 344 0.086 542 0.008 542 0.000 568 
Poland 4.635 422 0.095 1,593 -0.001 1,593 0.013 1,679 
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Portugal  6.665 160 0.057 354 -0.004 354 0.040 352 
Slovakia 5.659 7 0.076 44 0.024 44 0.000 50 
Slovenia 5.543 19 0.037 67 0.006 67 0.000 71 
Spain  6.871 564 0.058 659 -0.009 659 0.008 725 
Sweden  6.568 1,210 0.073 2,156 0.003 2,156 0.001 2,272 
UK  7.000 3,333 0.045 3,684 0.001 3,684 0.014 3,743 
Notes: Panels A, B and C describe all firm-level variables used in the regression analysis. The sample period is 2005–2013. The sample consists of 24 countries. See Appendix 
1 for definitions of all variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel D reports the mean values and number of observations by 
dependent variables and country. 
 
 75 
The mean values of |AWCA| and AWCA are 0.062 and -0.001 respectively. Also, 0.8 per 
cent of firms issued a qualified opinion, whereas the average for AUDFEE is 6.710. 
Panel D provides the mean values of all dependent variables by country. The mean 
value of OPINION is 0 in seven sample countries, so these countries are excluded when 
estimating Equation (3).18 Overall, these data, as well as untabulated correlations, do 
not suggest any unusual behaviour or multicollinearity issues.19 
3.4 Empirical findings 
This section presents empirical analysis of the results. It examines the average effect of 
alternative public oversight systems on audit fees, and investigates the consequences of 
different public oversight design features for audit quality. 
POA design and audit fees 
Table 3.5 reports the results of analysis of audit fees. As shown in Model 1, the 
coefficients for MEMBERSHIP and POWER are positive, at 0.285 and 0.197 
respectively, and are significant at the five per cent level. These findings reveal that, 
following the establishment of the POA, audit fees increase in countries where audit 
firm supervision is performed by non-practitioners only, and in countries where quality 
assurance and related tasks are concentrated in a single oversight body. In contrast, the 
coefficient estimate of RATING is insignificant. 
 
 
                                                 
18 This is because the country indicators perfectly predict the dependent dummy variable. 
19 The only exception is ROA, which is positively correlated with CFO and negatively correlated with LOSS. The 
empirical findings remain unchanged after dropping ROA from the audit opinion and audit fees analyses. 
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Table 3.5: Effect of POA design on audit fees 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
POA    
MEMBERSHIP 0.285** (2.22) 0.285*** (4.10) 
POWER 0.197** (2.57) 0.197*** (3.86) 
RATING -0.144 (-1.19) -0.144 (-1.57) 
Firm-level   
SIZE 0.647*** (90.69) 0.647*** (76.91) 
LOSS 0.113*** (5.83) 0.113*** (4.40) 
LEVERAGE -0.047 (-0.71) -0.047 (-0.51) 
BM -0.116*** (-8.46) -0.116*** (-6.66) 
CFO 0.002 (0.03) 0.002 (0.02) 
BIG4 0.167*** (6.20) 0.167*** (4.20) 
BUSY 0.095*** (4.06) 0.095** (2.86) 
LITIGIOUS -0.015 (-0.76) -0.015 (-0.47) 
LIQUIDITY -0.054*** (-7.96) -0.054*** (-5.08) 
ROA -0.685*** (-6.88) -0.685*** (-6.75) 
NBS 0.080*** (5.33) 0.080*** (4.28) 
NGS 0.121*** (6.57) 0.121*** (5.41) 
FORSALES 0.345*** (10.74) 0.345*** (8.78) 
INVREC 0.364*** (6.20) 0.364*** (6.20) 
OPINION 0.053 (0.57) 0.053 (0.59) 
Country-level   
GDP 1.209*** (3.62) 1.209*** (3.81) 
GDP_PER_CAP -0.000** (-2.77) -0.000** (-2.73) 
HHI 0.015 (0.28) 0.015 (0.36) 
Intercept -36.366*** (-3.90) -36.366*** (-4.11) 
No. of observations 13,482 13,482 
No. of countries 24 24 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.783 0.783 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from estimating the audit fees model. The sample period is 
2005–2013. The sample consists of 24 countries. For definitions of variables, see Appendix 1. Each POA 
variable equals 1 for all observations ending on or after the national law of public oversight became 
effective, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-
statistics based on country-year clusters (Model 1) or firm clusters (Model 2) and heteroskedasticity-
corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. All models include country- and industry year-
fixed effects. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed 
test). 
With regard to control variables, the audit fee model behaves in line with expectations, 
with a high R-squared of 0.783. In Model 2, the baseline specification is re-estimated 
after adopting firm-clustered standard errors, and the findings remain unchanged. 
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Table 3.6: Robustness analysis 
Independent 
variables 


















MEMBERSHIP -0.274*** 0.266 0.283** 0.291** 0.293** 0.260** 0.284** 0.199** 
 (-5.86) (1.44) (2.20) (2.28) (2.32) (2.03) (2.28) (2.04) 
POWER -0.146*** - 0.203** 0.200** 0.209** 0.142* 0.189** 0.330** 
 (-3.01) - (2.60) (2.57) (2.77) (1.87) (2.57) (2.79) 
RATING 0.269*** - -0.142 -0.144 -0.146 -0.152 -0.131 -0.025 
 (5.53) - (-1.16) (-1.19) (-1.22) (-1.28) (-1.20) (-0.23) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 12,515 13,482 13,420 11,528 11,489 10,149 11,885 13,482 
No. of countries 24 24 18 23 23 23 24 24 
Adj. R2 0.776 0.782 0.730 0.720 0.740 0.754 0.716 0.783 
Table 3.6 reports sensitivity tests based on Model 1 of Table 3.5. In Model 1, rather than reflecting both changes in the public oversight regime over time and differences 
between different types of regime in the cross-section, the POA variables are defined to include only cross-sectional differences for country-years with a public oversight regime 
in place. In Model 2, MEMBERSHIP is defined as the ratio of accounting professionals/practitioners to total board members. Model 3 excludes countries with fewer than 20 
observations. Models 4, 5 and 6 exclude the three largest countries in turn. Model 7 excludes firms cross-listed on a US stock exchange. Model 8 employs an alternative 
definition of POWER, as a dummy variable for firms in countries where the POA has sole responsibility for all three functions of inspection, investigation and disciplinary. The 
sample period is 2005–2013. The sample consists of 24 countries. See Appendix 1 for definitions of all variables. Each POA variable equals 1 for all observations ending on 
or after the national law of public oversight became effective, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics based on 
country-year clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are reported in parentheses. All models include country- and industry-year fixed effects. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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The robustness of the results reported in baseline Model 1, shown in Table 3.5, 
were assessed through a series of additional tests. For the sake of brevity, the table 
presents results only for the POA binary variables, but the full set of controls described 
earlier is included in all models. The results are tabulated in Table 3.6. Overall, the 
primary findings are robust to the following series of research design choices. 
First, all empirical models are re-estimated only for country-years with a public 
oversight regime in place, and therefore without including country-fixed effects. As 
shown in Table 3.6, in the case of audit fees, MEMBERSHIP and POWER are both 
negative, whereas RATING is positive. All estimates are significant (see Model 1). 
Second, an alternative definition of MEMBERSHIP is adopted, whereby 
MEMBERSHIP is measured by the ratio of the number of accounting 
professionals/practitioners to total board members.20 As reported in Model 2 of Table 
3.6, the estimate of MEMBERSHIP is still positive but insignificant, suggesting that 
the mere existence of professionals is more important than the weighting of professional 
representation on the board.  
Third, as discussed previously, the number of observations by country varies 
significantly, from very small (e.g. Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia) to very large (e.g. 
France and UK), which may unduly influence the regression results. Accordingly, the 
audit fees specification is re-estimated after dropping all countries with fewer than 20 
observations (see Model 3), and then after excluding the three largest countries 
                                                 
20 The data used to form the alternative definition of MEMBERSHIP are based mainly on IFIAR (2013, 2014). For 
Iceland, which is not a member of IFIAR, MEMBERSHIP is based on online sources. The data are available on 
request. 
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alternately (see Models 4, 5 and 6). The analysis in Table 3.6 shows that the baseline 
results are qualitatively identical to those reported earlier. 
Fourth, a recent stream of studies documents the effects on audit quality of 
PCAOB’S international inspections of non-US audit firms with US-listed foreign audit 
clients (Lamoreaux 2013; Shroff 2015; Krishnan, Krishnan, and Song, 2017). In this 
study, to provide evidence that the findings are not driven by US cross-listed firms 
subject to PCAOB inspections, the empirical analysis is repeated after excluding these 
firms. The primary results remain qualitatively unchanged (see Model 7). 
Finally, as indicated in Appendix 3, while the majority of national audit firm 
regulators have concentrated power, in several cases they have joint responsibility with 
other organisations, such as professional accounting bodies. In such cases, the POA’s 
power may be diluted. Therefore, the analysis is sharpened by employing an alternative 
definition of the POWER variable, as an indicator of firms in countries where the POA 
has sole (rather than joint) responsibility for all three functions of inspection, 
investigation and discipline. In this case, seven countries (29.2 per cent of the sample), 
namely Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden, have an 
audit firm regulator that is solely responsible for quality assurance and related tasks. 
The empirical findings shown in Model 8 reveal that the primary inferences persist: the 
estimate of POWER is 0.330 and significant at the five per cent level. 
Taken together, the results shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate significant 
increases in audit costs following the adoption of the public oversight system, when: a) 
audit firm oversight is performed only by non-practitioners who are potentially more 
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independent and objective, or b) a single audit firm regulator is in charge of the entire 
quality assurance process and is therefore potentially more effective. 
POA design and audit quality 
Table 3.7 reports the results of analysis of audit quality. 
Table 3.7: Effect of POA design on audit quality 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
 |AWCA| AWCA OPINION 
POA    
MEMBERSHIP 0.006 (1.49) -0.001 (-0.27) -0.539 (-1.20) 
POWER -0.003 (-0.82) -0.002 (-0.66) -0.350 (-1.11) 
RATING 0.004 (0.85) -0.006 (-1.34) -0.048 (-0.13) 
Firm-level    
SIZE -0.007*** (-18.19) 0.001** (2.84) -0.047 (-0.81) 
LOSS 0.013*** (8.20) -0.050*** (-20.23) 0.318 (1.48) 
LEVERAGE -0.026*** (-5.03) -0.006 (-1.18) -0.769 (-1.16) 
BM -0.011*** (-11.39) 0.003** (3.16) 0.030 (0.36) 
CFO -0.100*** (-9.19) -0.274*** (-21.92) -2.449*** (-3.37) 
BIG4 -0.011*** (-6.53) 0.001 (0.75) -0.008 (-0.04) 
BUSY -0.002 (-1.13) -0.002 (-1.19) -0.382 (-1.23) 
LITIGIOUS -0.001 (-0.92) 0.002 (1.01) 0.372** (2.03) 
AGE -0.003*** (-3.99) -0.003*** (-3.54) 0.289** (2.56) 
LAGGED_ACCRUALS 0.002 (0.24) -0.109*** (-10.51) - 
SALES_GROWTH 0.088*** (23.17) -0.004 (-0.71) - 
LIQUIDITY - - -0.116 (-1.61) 
ROA - - -1.275** (-2.10) 
Country-level    
GDP -0.027 (-1.41) -0.057* (-1.78) -5.037** (-2.75) 
GDP_PER_CAP 0.000 (1.18) 0.000 (1.54) 0.000 (0.20) 
RULE 0.008 (0.62) -0.018 (-1.56) 1.731 (1.27) 
Intercept 0.901 (1.57) 1.644 (1.88) 137.401*** (43.91) 
No. of observations 23,487 23,487 19,742 
No. of countries 24 24 17 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.233 0.097 0.211 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from estimating the audit quality models. The sample period is 
2005-2013. The sample consists of 24 countries. See Appendix 1 for definitions of all variables. Each 
POA variable equals 1 for all observations ending on or after the national law of public oversight became 
effective, and 0 otherwise. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-
statistics (z-statistics) based on country-year clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All models include country- and industry year-fixed effects. ***, ** and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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The analysis begins with abnormal accruals in Models 1 and 2 (absolute and signed 
values respectively). As reported, none of the variables of interest is statistically 
significant. In all models, firm-level control variables are generally significant and in a 
direction consistent with previous research. For example, Model 1 shows that larger 
and older firms with higher leverage, book-to-market ratios and operating cash flows, 
and Big 4 audit firms have lower levels of absolute abnormal accruals, whereas less 
profitable firms with higher sales growth display higher accruals. Model 3 presents 
regression analysis of the dependent variable, OPINION. 
The results mirror those reported in Models 1 and 2: all POA variables are 
insignificant. As with the audit fees analysis, additional robustness tests were performed, 
and untabulated findings reveal that the main inferences remain unchanged. 21 
Collectively, these results provide no evidence to suggest that the adoption of 
alternative public oversight systems is associated with different levels of audit quality. 
The only exceptions is the test using cross-sectional POA variables. For the cross-
sectional POA variables, MEMBERSHIP and POWER are positive and significant 
when the outcome variable is |AWCA| but insignificant for the signed AWCA and 
OPINION outcome variables. Overall, these empirical findings differ from the baseline 
results, but should be viewed very cautiously given the inability to control for 
unobserved country-level with country-fixed effects. 
                                                 
21 Specifically, the sample uses cross-sectional POA variables, alternative definition of MEMBERSHIP, excludes 
five countries with fewer than 100 observations and the three largest countries (Germany, France and the UK), as 
well as US cross-listed firms, and an alternative POWER definition is employed. Also, abnormal accruals and audit 
opinion specifications are re-estimated after clustering standard errors at the firm level. An attempt was also made 
to adjust the logit estimator for analysis of OPINION to allow for low frequency of positive values, using relogit in 
STATA. However, this STATA estimator does not allow for inclusion of factor variables and time-series operators 
(e.g. industry-year fixed effects) as well as some other options (e.g. ‘robust’ and ‘cluster’), so this proved infeasible. 
 82 
Collectively, these results generally provide no evidence to suggest that the 
adoption of alternative public oversight systems is associated with different levels of 
audit quality. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This study examines the implications for audit pricing and audit quality of different 
ways of designing public audit oversight, with a focus on POA membership and powers, 
and the content of inspection reports. Based on a hand-collected dataset covering 24 
EU countries, the study documents wide variations in external audit regulation systems 
across the EU. Significant increases in audit fees are observed when the national audit 
firm regulator’s membership consists solely of non-practitioners, or when the entire 
quality assurance process is performed by a single oversight authority. Thus, the 
findings suggest that audit costs increase when audit firm oversight is carried out by 
independent and potentially more objective POA members, or by oversight authorities 
with greater enforcement power and potentially more efficient processes. However, no 
differences in audit quality are detected associated with alternative public oversight 
design choices. This result is consistent with the view expressed in previous literature 
that public oversight may be compliance-driven rather than focusing on a holistic 
assessment of audit quality (Boone et al. 2015). Alternatively, the research 
methodologies used in extant archival studies may not capture the quality of audit 
engagements undertaken by audit firms. 
Overall, this study is the first to generate evidence regarding the implications of 
alternative external audit regulation designs for audit pricing and quality, and addresses 
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a long-standing debate over the relative merits of monitoring by experienced 
practitioners or by independent non-practitioners. It thus provides a starting point for 
further research, as well as potentially useful insights for policy makers and national 
audit firm regulators. 
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Chapter 4: Consequences of Inspection Ratings for Audit 
Pricing, Audit Firm Tenure and Audit Quality – Evidence 
from the UK 
4.1 Introduction 
Having examined public oversight practices at a pan-European level in Chapter 3, this 
chapter focuses specifically on the UK. The study presented in this chapter measures 
the potential costs and benefits of providing overall quality ratings for audit firms under 
inspection. The costs include the effect on audit fees and the likelihood of clients 
switching audit firms, while the benefits refer to the quality of assurance provided by 
audit firms. 
The 2006 Directive requires each EU member state to set up a system for public 
oversight of the audit profession, which has replaced previous self-regulation (i.e. peer-
review) systems in several European countries. In the UK, public inspection of the audit 
profession is a central feature of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC). In December 
2008, the FRC began to publicly disclose inspection reports for major individual audit 
firms that have UK clients.22 These reports contain information about the audit firm 
under review, the period over which the inspection was conducted, the fiscal year end 
covered and, more importantly, an overall quality rating for each audit firm’s individual 
audit engagements under review. 
The study’s focus on inspection ratings is motivated by Lennox and Pittman (2010), 
                                                 
22 According to the FRC (2016), these clients are ‘related to FTSE 100, FTSE 250, other listed and other major 
public interest entities’. 
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who argue that clients do not perceive a PCAOB inspection as a signal of audit quality, 
whereas a favourable (or unfavourable) peer-review report may have a positive (or 
negative) impact on an audit firm’s market share. They further demonstrate that the 
signalling role of peer-review reports stems mainly from information that PCAOB 
inspectors do not publicly disclose, such as overall quality ratings. As the FRC provides 
summary scores for quality in its inspection reports, this study examines the FRC’s 
ratings and measures their costs and benefits for audit firms. 
The consequences for audit pricing of providing an overall quality rating are 
unclear. On the one hand, more deficient ratings may damage an audit firm’s reputation, 
which may induce it to reduce its price in order to retain clients (Acito et al. 2013; 
Boone et al. 2015). On the other hand, audit firms may have to expend greater effort 
and resources to adjust their audit procedures in order to avoid fines or other monetary 
penalties (e.g. Acito et al. 2013; DeFond and Lennox 2017). In an oligopolistic audit 
market, since the audit fee is cost-driven, the audit firm will pass on the incremental 
cost to its clients, which will increase audit fees (Lyon and Maher 2005; Boone et al. 
2015). This may be particularly the case for Big 4 audit firms, where clients may have 
little or no choice of alternative auditors. As a result, Big 4 audit firms may be more 
likely to pass on increased costs via fees. In terms of audit quality, the independence of 
FRC staff from the audit profession, and the FRC’s diversity of funding sources suggest 
that its inspections are credible,23 and may help distinguish between high and low audit 
                                                 
23  As shown in Appendix 3, FRC board members are all non-practitioners who are independent of the audit 
profession. Based on information from IFIAR (2013), the FRC has a variety of funding sources, including the 
business community, the accountancy profession and the UK government. 
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quality. However, for similar reasons to the audit firm switching analysis, the FRC 
rating may not relate to audit quality due to concerns about the FRC staff’s expertise 
and experience, inspection approach and inspection focus. Overall, the consequences 
of FRC inspections for audit fees, audit turnover and audit quality are open to question. 
To examine the consequences of FRC inspection ratings, first, the impact of ratings 
on audit fees is measured. Using a large sample of UK-listed clients for the period 
2008–2016, a significant increase in audit fees is found when the audit firm has a higher 
proportion of engagements with lower ratings. Specifically, a 10 per cent increase in 
deficient ratings will generate a 5.33 per cent audit fee premium. Furthermore, this 
increase in audit fees is more concentrated among clients with Big 4 audit firms. Next, 
the impact of inspection ratings on audit firm switching is investigated, proxied by the 
likelihood of switching audit firm between years. Unlike audit fees, there is no evidence 
to suggest that ratings may affect clients’ likelihood of switching audit firms. This 
indicates that FRC ratings are not perceived by audit committees as a signal of audit 
quality, and thus do not affect their audit firm appointment decisions. Finally, the 
association between FRC ratings and audit quality is examined, proxied by abnormal 
accruals, total accruals and the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit opinion. 
Consistent with the result for audit firm switching, no significant relationship is found 
between FRC ratings and audit quality, which further demonstrates that rating results 
may not signal audit quality. 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the cost and benefits of public 
oversight regimes, and is most closely related to studies by Gunny and Zhang (2013) 
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and Acito et al. (2013). In classifying PCAOB inspection reports into three types based 
on the severity and number of deficiencies disclosed, Gunny and Zhang (2013) find that 
PCAOB inspection outcomes are associated with lower audit quality when the reports 
are seriously deficient. However, this result applies only to triennially-inspected audit 
firms, whereas in the case of annually-inspected audit firms, they find no relationship. 
According to Gunny and Zhang (2013), a report is ‘clean’ if no deficiencies are 
identified, ‘deficient’ if one or more audit deficiencies are found, and ‘seriously 
deficient’ if the deficiency relates to a ‘failure to identify a departure from GAAP’ 
and/or a particular deficiency results in a ‘restatement’ of the financial statements. Acito 
et al. (2013) investigate the association between PCAOB inspection findings and 
changes in audit fees and audit firm switching for clients of Big 4 audit firms. Using 
the relative exposure to deficient auditing, they find that this exposure is positively 
related to audit firm changes, but is unrelated to changes in audit fees.24 In addition to 
these two studies, other studies (e.g. Offermanns 2011) also attempt to link PCAOB 
inspection results with changes in audit firm behaviour. 25  However, as PCAOB 
inspection reports do not provide overall quality ratings, all of the above studies carry 
out their own classifications of reports to differentiate the results. However, this 
                                                 
24 According to Acito et al. (2013), relative exposure to deficient auditing is measured as the difference between 
deficient auditing exposure with the current audit firm and adjusted audit firm deficiency exposure that the client 
would face with other audit firms. Specifically, by matching a keyword list (based on deficiencies identified in 
PCAOB inspection reports) with the number of times these keywords relate to each standard identified in the client’s 
10-K filing, audit firm deficiency exposure is calculated as the client’s standardised keyword count for an accounting 
standard multiplied by an indicator variable which is equal to one if the PCAOB identifies a client’s audit firm as 
having a deficiency relating to that standard. 
25 Offermanns (2011) tests the impact of PCAOB inspections on residual audit fees. Similarly to Gunny and Zhang 
(2013), he classifies audit firms into two groups, namely audit firms with detected deficiencies and those with no 
deficiencies from the inspection process. He finds that inspections lead to an increase in audit fees for clients with 
deficient audit firms. 
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subjective classification system may potentially decrease the credibility of the results. 
Furthermore, rather than applying a continuous variable, using a dummy variable to 
distinguish between ‘clean’ and ‘deficient’ reports may not reflect subtle changes in 
audit quality, given that the quality of internal control, the audit firm’s processes and 
the quality of audit engagement may lie between these two extreme cases. Finally, all 
of these studies are based in the US, and it is unclear whether the results are applicable 
to other institutional settings. The only exception to the above is Cheon et al.’s (2016) 
study of a Korean setting. They find that both quality control system deficiencies and 
audit engagement deficiencies discussed in the inspection report are credible in 
distinguishing between lower- and higher-quality firms. However, similarly to the 
aforementioned US studies, the Korean oversight authority does not give overall quality 
ratings for audit engagement deficiencies. Moreover, using the natural logarithm of the 
number of audit engagement deficiencies to classify inspection reports may be 
inappropriate because larger audit firms normally have more engagements being 
inspected, which may result in more deficiencies being disclosed. Therefore, a higher 
logarithm value in this case may simply indicate that the audit firm has had more 
engagements inspected, rather than lower audit quality. 
The study presented in this chapter makes several contributions. First, rather than 
classifying reports based on the deficiencies disclosed, this study is the first to use 
quality ratings drawn directly from FRC inspection reports. In doing so, it employs a 
more objective measure of inspection findings. For example, as the PCAOB does not 
provide ratings in its inspection reports, Gunny and Zhang’s (2013) approach to 
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defining reports as ‘clean’, ‘deficient’ or ‘seriously deficient’ requires the exercise of 
some judgment, and is therefore potentially subjective. Classifying audit failures into 
deficiencies or serious deficiencies presumes a good understanding of several related 
factors, including the materiality of the failure. Arguably, the audit regulator (e.g. the 
FRC) is in a better position to assess the severity of audit failures and classify them 
accordingly. In summary, this study complements Gunny and Zhang’s (2013) work by 
employing a more refined and potentially more informative audit quality rating. 
Moreover, rather than using an indicator variable (i.e. ‘clean’ or ‘deficient’), this 
study uses a continuous variable, measured as the proportion of engagements with a 
low rating out of the total engagements inspected. This research design complements 
the strengths and weaknesses of previous research design choices because it is able to 
both reflect subtle changes in audit quality and avoid the aforementioned problems 
associated with using logarithmic values. 
Second, this research focuses on the UK and extends the literature on the 
consequences of audit inspections for audit pricing and audit quality outside the US. 
Finally, this study contributes to debate on the quality of the content of audit firm 
inspection reports and the value of the audit firm inspection process. There is mixed 
evidence on whether audit firm inspection reports affect the supply and demand of audit 
services (e.g. Lennox and Pittman 2010; Acito 2013; Gunny and Zhang 2013). This 
study contributes by providing evidence that inspection ratings may increase audit costs, 
but may not be valuable in distinguishing audit quality, thus having no effect on audit 
committees’ audit firm appointment decisions. This finding advances understanding of 
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the effectiveness of the audit inspection regime and provides auditing regulators with 
guidance on policy making. 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Institutional setting 
In 2003, the FRC became the POA for the audit profession in the UK (IFIAR 2013). In 
2004, following the government’s review of audit regulation, a Professional Oversight 
Board (POB) was set up within the FRC to inspect the audit profession (FRC 2012). In 
2006, with the release of Directive 2006/43/EC by the EC, public oversight was 
introduced across Europe, and the UK began the transposition process by drafting the 
Companies Act 2006, which became effective in 2008 (UK Parliament 2006). Unlike 
the PCAOB, which discloses inspection reports for each individual audit firm being 
inspected, the FRC was already publicly disclosing annual public reports with principal 
findings relating to major audit firms in the UK. Following this, in December 2008, the 
FRC began to publicly disclose inspection reports for major individual audit firms that 
audit listed and other major public interest UK entities (FRC 2016).26 
Figure 4.1: Development of public oversight in UK 
 
Source: UK Parliament 2006; FRC 2012, 2016; IFIAR 2013 
Inspection reports for individual audit firms are disclosed on the FRC’s website. 
                                                 
26 Checks with FRC staff confirmed that Alternative Investment Market (AIM) companies can only be selected if 
they meet the threshold (e.g. a market capitalisation of £100 million) set by the FRC. Only a minority of AIM 























However, before completing the inspection, the audit firm being inspected has a right 
to provide a response letter to the FRC, which is also attached to the final inspection 
report (FRC 2016). Moreover, during each inspection, the FRC must have constant 
contact with the audit firm being inspected, since it has to examine many different 
dimensions of the firm. Therefore, the audit firm knows the inspection result long 
before the publication date and even before the inspection is completed, and clients may 
also find out the results in advance by checking with the audit firm. 
Individual inspection reports contain a lot of information, including the name of 
the audit firm being reviewed, the period over which the inspection was conducted, the 
fiscal year covered, areas of focus in the inspection, principal findings, and the audit 
firm’s response to the inspection results (FRC 2016). For each inspection, using a risk-
based approach, the FRC assesses both the quality of individual audits and the quality 
of the audit firm’s control procedures (FRC 2016). In the inspection report, the FRC 
issues a summary score for the quality of each audit engagement reviewed, rating it as 
‘Good’ (category 1), ‘Limited improvements required’ (category 2A), ‘Improvements 
required’ (category 2B) or ‘Significant improvements required’ (category 3) (FRC 
2016).27 The rating scales indicate audit quality from high to low, and are defined as 
follows: 
An audit is assessed as good where we identified no areas for improvement of 
sufficient significance to include in our formal report. Limited improvements 
required indicates that we had only limited concerns to report. Improvements 
                                                 
27 Neither the client’s name nor the audit partner’s name for each audit engagement are provided in the report. 
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required indicates that more substantive improvements were needed in relation 
to one or more issues reported. An audit is assessed as requiring significant 
improvements if we have significant concerns in relation to the sufficiency or 
quality of audit evidence, the appropriateness of key audit judgments or other 
matters identified (FRC 2016). 
4.2.2 Inspection reports and their outcomes 
Table 4.1: Number of engagements inspected by audit firm (2009–2016) 
Audit Firm (short title) Number of audit engagements 
inspected 
Weight (%) 
Deloitte LLP (Deloitte) 125 19.65 
Ernst & Young LLP (E&Y) 111 17.45 
KPMG LLP (KPMG) 126 19.81 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) 141 22.17 
Baker Tilly UK Audit LLP (Baker Tilly) 17 2.67 
BDO LLP (BDO) 36 5.66 
Crowe Clark Whitehill LLP (Crowe Clark) 15 2.36 
Grant Thornton UK LLP (Grant Thornton) 42 6.60 
Mazars LLP (Mazars) 9 1.42 
PKF (UK) LLP (PKF) 14 2.21 
Total 636 100 
Table 4.1 shows the number of engagements inspected by the FRC for each individual 
audit firm from 2009 to 2016. In total, 636 audit engagements were inspected during 
this period. Among these, 79.08 per cent of engagements related to Big 4 audit firms, 
with PwC having the highest number of engagements inspected (22.17 per cent). 
Table 4.2 shows the total number of audit engagements for all audit firms, sorted by 
rating and publication year. 
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Table 4.2: Engagements by rating and publication year 
Publication 








required (c3) Total 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
2009 0 0.00 30 42.86 32 45.71 8  11.43 70 100 
2010 0 0.00 37 55.22 23 34.33 7  10.45 67 100 
2011 0 0.00 37 50.68 28 38.36 8  10.96 73 100 
2012 0 0.00 36 48.00 33 44.00 6 8.00 75 100 
2013 0 0.00 46 65.71 16 22.86 8 11.43 70 100 
2014 0 0.00 47 63.38 17 23.29 9 13.33 73 100 
2015 0 0.00 69 66.35 25 24.04 10 9.62 104 100 
2016 0 0.00 80 76.92 22 21.15 2 1.92 104 100 
Total 0 0 382 59.97 196 30.77 59 9.26 636 100 
Note: % shows the proportion of the number of engagements for each rating of total engagements 
reviewed each year. 
It is evident that the number of engagements for ‘Limited improvements required’ grew 
steadily from 2009 to 2016, increasing from 42.86 per cent in 2009 to more than 76.92 
per cent in 2016. This was different for engagements with ‘Improvements required’, 
which fluctuated between 2009 and 2016, reaching their highest in 2012 with a 
weighting of 44 per cent and their lowest in 2013 with a weighting of around 22 per 
cent. The proportion of engagements rated as ‘Significant improvements required’ 
remained stable, except in 2016 when it dropped to about two per cent. Finally, the table 
also shows that no audit engagements were rated ‘Good’ in any inspection year. Overall, 
between 2009 and 2016, engagements rated as ‘Limited improvements required’ had 
the highest weighting (59.97 per cent in total), while those rated as ‘Significant 
improvements required’ had the lowest (9.26 per cent in total). 
In addition to sorting ratings by inspection year, Table 4.3 shows the total number 
of audit engagements inspected by the FRC sorted by rating and individual audit firm 
for all years. As this table shows, the audit firm with the highest number of engagements 
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rated ‘Limited improvements required’ was Deloitte, with 72 per cent of its total. 











Required (c3) Total 
 N % N % N % N %  N  % 
Deloitte 0 0.00 90 72.00 28 22.40 7 5.60 125 100 
E&Y 0 0.00 64 57.66 37 33.33 10 9.01 111 100 
KPMG 0 0.00 77 61.11 38 30.16 11 8.73 126 100 
PWC 0 0.00 94 66.67 39 27.66 8 5.67 141 100 
Baker Tilly 0 0.00 3 17.65 9 52.94 5 29.41 17 100 
BDO 0 0.00 18 50.00 14 38.89 4 11.11 36 100 
Crowe Clark 0 0.00 6 40.00 8 53.33 1 6.67 15 100 
Grant Thornton 0 0.00 17 40.48 17 40.48 8 19.05 42 100 
Mazars 0 0.00 5 55.56 2 22.22 2 22.22 9 100 
PKF 0 0.00 8 57.14 4 28.57 2 14.29 14 100 
Total 0 0.00 382 59.97 196 30.77 59 9.26 636 100 
Note: % shows the proportion of the number of engagements for each rating of total engagements 
reviewed for each audit firm. 
The audit firm with the lowest number and weighting of ‘Limited improvements 
required’ ratings was Baker Tilly, with less than 20 per cent of engagements. For 
‘Improvements required’, Crowe Clark had the highest weighting, with more than half 
of it engagements. For ‘Significant improvements required’, Baker Tilly had the largest 
weighting, with almost 30 per cent of audit engagements falling within this rating. 
Moreover, Deloitte and PwC performed best in this respect, as only around five per cent 
of their engagements were rated as ‘Significant improvements required’. 
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Table 4.4 Fiscal year ends covered in inspection reports 
 
Publication 
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Table 4.4 presents data for the fiscal year ends covered in each inspection, listed 
by audit firm and publication year.28 Owing to the time lag, the fiscal year ends covered 
in the inspection report normally refer to the previous fiscal year.29 Big 4 audit firms 
are inspected annually, so inspections cover almost all fiscal years,30 whereas the other 
audit firms are inspected less frequently, so some fiscal years are not covered by FRC 
inspections. 
4.2.3 Theory and related literature 
Several previous studies (e.g. Anantharaman 2007; DeFond 2010; Gramling et al. 2011; 
Carcello et al. 2011; Gunny and Zhang 2013) seek to measure the consequences of audit 
regulation. Regulation intervention may affect the behaviour of both audit firms and 
clients, and thus the supply of and demand for audit services (DeFond and Zhang 2014). 
More specifically, a rating which is the result of an inspection process is likely to affect 
the incentives of audit firms and clients, which may in turn affect audit pricing, the 
likelihood of audit firm switching and audit quality. 
Audit fees 
Based on previous literature, audit fees are the sum of the costs of an audit firm’s 
effort and expected legal liabilities (e.g. Simunic 1980; Lyon and Maher 2005; Choi et 
al. 2008). If the audit firm is found to have deficiencies, its reputation may be damaged, 
                                                 
28 In most cases, the FRC gives fiscal year ends rounded to a month. Hence, when forming test variables, the last 
day of the month is used as the lower and upper limit. For example, when the fiscal year end is between 06/2008 and 
06/2009, it is treated as 30/06/2008-30/06/2009. The results are robust to using the first day of the month as the 
lower and upper limit. 
29 According to the FRC (2014), one December 2011 year-end engagement for E&Y was reviewed during the 
2013/14 inspection, and thus belongs to the previous inspection period; when forming test variables, this engagement 
was excluded and the fiscal end covered for year 2014 was redefined as 04/2012-03/2013. The result is robust if all 
E&Y’s firm-year observations for 2014 are dropped. 
30 For the most recent-inspection reports, the fiscal year ends are not provided in annual reports; the FRC confirmed 
that the periods were similar to the previous inspection report, generally from June 2014 to April 2015. 
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which may result in decreased demand for its audit services (e.g. Hilary and Lennox 
2005; Abbot et al. 2012). In this case, the audit firm may reduce its prices to retain 
clients (Acito et al. 2013; Boone et al. 2015). 
However, the audit firm may also increase its audit fees. If more of its engagements 
receive a deficient rating, it will be required to expend greater effort and expertise (more 
audit hours and higher cost per hour) in adjusting its audit procedures (e.g. Acito et al. 
2013; DeFond and Lennox 2017); otherwise, it may face fines and other monetary 
penalties (e.g. Carcello et al. 2011; Osma et al. 2014; Gipper et al. 2015). At the same 
time, the risk of fines and other monetary penalties is likely to increase the cost of legal 
liabilities, so an audit firm with more deficient ratings in inspection reports may 
increase either or both cost components (i.e. audit effort cost and legal liability cost). 
In an oligopolistic audit market such as the UK, since the audit fee is cost-driven, the 
audit firm may pass on the incremental cost to its clients, which may increase audit fees 
(Lyon and Maher 2005; Boone et al. 2015). Moreover, in selecting Big 4 audit firms, 
clients have little or no choice of alternative firms, so the threat of switching is less 
credible. Thus, the Big 4 audit firms may be more able to pass on increased costs 
through fees. Overall, the general impact of the FRC rating on audit fees remains 
undetermined, so the following first research question is formulated: 
RQ1: How does an inspection report with more deficient engagements affect audit 
fees? 
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Audit firm switching 
Several previous studies have examined the consequences of audit firm changes 
following a specific event (e.g. Barton 2005; Weber, Willenborg, and Zhang 2008; 
Wieczynska 2016). An audit firm switch usually represents a change in audit quality 
(DeFond and Zhang 2014), and clients have incentives to increase the credibility of 
their financial reports by appointing high-quality audit firms (Teoh and Wong 1993). In 
the context of this study, an audit firm with more deficient ratings may incur 
reputational damage, which may shrink demand for its audit services, since clients may 
respond by switching to higher-quality audit firms (e.g. Weber et al. 2008; Lennox and 
Pittman 2010; Skinner and Srinivasan 2012). However, the following considerations 
may potentially mitigate the risk of switching following an unfavourable inspection 
report. 
First, the classical trade-off between the FRC’s expertise and independence (e.g. 
Palmrose 2006; Groff and Hocevar 2009; DeFond 2010; Carson et al. 2017; Gunny and 
Zhang 2013) may moderate any increased risk of audit firm switching. As shown in 
Appendix 3, the FRC’s board members are all non-practitioners. Compared with 
previous peer-review systems, the FRC’s greater independence from the audit 
profession may contribute to more objective and judicial inspections (Hilary and 
Lennox 2005; Carcello et al. 2011). However, inadequate expertise and professionalism 
of the oversight staff may give rise to questions as to the credibility and efficiency of 
inspections (DeFond 2010). Some may argue that although FRC inspectors come from 
public practice and have some audit experience, this experience may quickly become 
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outdated and fall behind current knowledge (Glover et al. 2009). As clients are aware 
of this, audit committees may perceive FRC inspection findings to have low credibility, 
such that they will not alter their switching decisions. 
Second, the inspection approach may also alleviate the risk of audit firm switching. 
According to the FRC (2015), its reviews are selected on a risk basis using a risk model, 
and each review covers only selected aspects of the relevant audit. Since the audit firms 
in the sample for this study are large firms, and their client bases are also large, there is 
little likelihood that the selected engagements will be representative of the audit firm’s 
overall client base (e.g. DeFond 2010; Gunny and Zhang 2013; Acito et al. 2013). As 
clients understand this, 31  their audit committees may pay less attention to the 
inspection results. 
Third, the focus of the inspection may lessen the likelihood of audit firm switching. 
According to Boone et al. (2015), inspectors may focus more on compliance, 
documentation and substantiation of audit inputs and processes, rather than on audit 
outcomes, and this may not be viewed by audit committees as being significantly 
related to audit quality. For example, in Deloitte’s 2016 inspection report, the FRC 
showed that one audit engagement had carried out insufficient audit procedures to prove 
that transactions had been correctly classified; however, despite presenting this minor 
issue on procedural compliance and adequacy, the FRC did not indicate its overall 
impact on the final audit outcome or audit quality (e.g. specific impact on revenue, 
earnings or final audit opinion), so the audit committee in this context may not have 
                                                 
31 The risk inspection approach is disclosed in the inspection report, so clients are aware of it. 
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found this information useful. As Beattie et al. (2013) suggest, the new regime is largely 
process- and compliance-driven, with high costs for limited benefit. Consistent with 
this point, other studies (e.g. Glover et al. 2009; DeFond and Lennox 2011; Acito et al. 
2013) also argue that deficiencies disclosed in inspection reports are trivial and 
insignificant, and thus audit committees may not find the reports informative. 
Overall, the impact of FRC ratings on audit firm switching is unclear. Thus, the 
second research question is stated as follows: 
RQ2: How does an inspection report with more deficient engagements affect audit 
firm switching? 
Audit quality 
Having analysed the consequences of FRC ratings for audit fees and audit firm 
switching, next, the relationship between FRC ratings and audit quality is investigated, 
namely whether inspection ratings reflect underlying audit quality. According to 
DeAngelo (1981), audit quality is ‘the market-assessed joint probability that a given 
auditor will both discover a breach in a client’s accounting system, and report the 
breach’. However, as audit quality is not directly observable, the market must use 
proxies for it (Abbott et al. 2012). The FRC’s inspection ratings provide possible 
representations of audit quality to distinguish between high- and low-quality audits. 
On the one hand, FRC ratings are expected to be fair and credible; thus, an audit 
firm with more deficiencies disclosed in the inspection report will signify lower audit 
quality. This is supported by the following considerations. First, the FRC’s greater 
independence from the audit profession ensures the objectivity of the review process, 
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thereby improving the credibility of the inspection report (Hilary and Lennox 2005; 
Carcello et al. 2011; Gunny and Zhang 2013). Second, the FRC devotes significant 
resources to the inspection activity and has access to sufficient funding for its activities. 
According to the FRC’s annual reports (2008–2015), its actual expenditure on audit 
inspections has doubled, increasing from £2.1 million in 2008 to £4.3 million in 2015. 
Moreover, it has various funding sources for its operations. According to IFIAR (2013), 
the FRC’s core operating costs in relation to accounting are funded by the business 
community, the accountancy profession and the UK government. This range of funding 
sources ensures that it has sufficient funding for its daily work, such that the quality of 
its work can be guaranteed. 
Nevertheless, for similar reasons to the audit firm switching analysis, the FRC’s 
ratings may not relate to audit quality, owing to concerns about its staff expertise and 
experience, inspection approach and inspection focus. Thus, the association between 
audit quality and FRC ratings remains open to question, and the third research question 
for this study is formulated as follows: 
RQ3: How does an inspection report with more deficient engagements relate to 
audit quality? 
4.3 Research design and data 
4.3.1 Empirical models 
Audit fees 
Regression analysis is used to measure the impact of the latest available FRC rating 
(rating in year t-1) on current audit fees (audit fees in year t). Based on previous 
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literature (e.g. Simunic 1980; Choi et al. 2008), the audit fee model is as follows: 
Audit Feest =β0 + β1 PROC3t-1 + Σβj Firm-Specific Controlsj,t +Σβk Fixed Effects + εt    (1) 
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, there is a time lag between the publication year and 
the fiscal year to which the inspection rating relates. Therefore, it should be noted that 
the timing of the inspection rating (i.e. t-1) used in equation 1 refers to the fiscal year. 
AUDFEE is measured as the log of audit fees in thousands of British pounds (GBP). β1 
is the coefficient of the test variable and measures the impact of the rating in year t-1 
on audit fees in year t. PROC3 is constructed as the proportion of engagements rated 
‘Significant improvements required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for 
each audit firm for a specific year. Following previous studies (Simunic 1980; Lyon 
and Maher 2005; Gul 2006; Carcello and Li 2013), a number of client-specific variables 
are included, which are predicted to be associated with audit fees (SIZE, LEVERAGE, 
ROA, LOSS, BM, CFO, BIG4, BUSY, OPINION, LIQUIDITY), as well as the number 
of business segments (NBS), the number of geographical segments (NGS), the 
proportion of foreign sales (FORSALES) and the intensity of receivables and inventory 
(INVREC). Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 4. 
Audit firm switching 
Logistic regression is used to measure the impact of the latest available rating on the 
propensity of clients to switch audit firms. Following previous literature (Weber et al. 
2008; Boone et al. 2015), the model is as follows: 
Switchingt =β0 + β1 PROC3t-1 + Σβj Firm-Specific Controlsj,t +Σβk Fixed Effects + εt    (2) 
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As previously discussed, there is a time lag between the publication year and the 
fiscal year to which the inspection rating relates, so the timing of the inspection rating 
(i.e. t-1) used in equation 2 refers to the fiscal year. SWITCH is equal to 1 if a client 
changed audit firm between the previous (t-1) and current (t) year, and 0 otherwise. β1 
is the coefficient of the test variable, measured as in equation (1). A number of client-
specific variables predicted to be associated with clients’ switching decisions are also 
included (SIZE, LEVERAGE, ROA, LOSS, OPINION), as well as percentage change in 
size (%SIZE), percentage change in leverage (%LEVERAGE) and the intensity of 
receivables and inventory (INVREC). 
Audit quality 
Audit quality is measured in four main ways: a) absolute abnormal accruals, b) signed 
abnormal accruals, c) total accruals, and d) the likelihood of the audit firm issuing a 
qualified audit opinion. 
Audit Qualityt =β0 + β1 PROC3t + Σβj Firm-Specific Controlsj,t +Σβk Fixed Effects + εt  (3) 
As for the previous models, the time lag between the publication year and the fiscal 
year to which the inspection rating relates is accounted for by using the fiscal year as 
the year of the inspection rating. Rather than using a lagged rating, as in the audit fees 
and audit firm switching analyses, current audit quality proxies (i.e. audit quality in 
year t) are matched with the current rating (i.e. rating in year t) to observe whether 
inspection report ratings are useful in determining underlying audit quality. 
For the dependent variables, DeFond and Park’s (2001) approach, which is also  
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used in previous studies (e.g. Carey and Simnett 2006; Wang and Xin 2011), is adopted  
to estimate abnormal working capital accruals. This measure is used because previous 
research suggests that managers have the most discretion over working capital accruals 
(Becker et al. 1998; Ashbaugh et al. 2003). Total accruals and the likelihood of the audit 
firm issuing a qualified audit opinion are used as additional proxies for audit quality. A 
number of client-specific variables predicted to be associated with these proxies (e.g. 
size, profitability, sales growth, operating cash flows, market-to-book ratio) are also 
included (e.g. Carcello and Li 2013; Gunny and Zhang 2013; Horton, Tuna, and Wood 
2014). Definitions of all variables are given in Appendix 4. 
Finally, in all three models, year dummies and industry dummies are included to 
control for year-fixed and industry-fixed effects that may affect the dependent variables 
(e.g. Gunny and Zhang 2013). Furthermore, as the test variables are based on each audit 
firm, audit firm-fixed effects are included in the model to control for unobserved audit 
firm characteristics that may affect estimation of the test variable. The model is 
clustered at the client level.32 All continuous variables are winsorised at the one per 
cent and 99 per cent levels. 
4.3.2 Sample selection 
Ratings data cover inspection reports for the period 2007–2015,33 collected from FRC  
                                                 
32 In alternative models, industry-clustered standard errors were used when calculating t statistics for all analyses. 
33 As shown in Table 4.4, ratings data are available from 2007 to 2015. As discussed, for the audit fees study, it was 
proposed to measure the association between the latest available rating (i.e. rating in year t-1) and current audit fees 
(year t). As rating data start from 2007, the audit fees data corresponding with rating data for 2007 should be data in 
the following year, namely 2008; Also, as the ratings data end in 2015, the corresponding audit fees data should be 
for 2016. Therefore, for the audit fees study, the firm-year observations run from 2008 to 2016. This is the same for 
the audit firm switching analysis. For the audit quality study, current ratings (ratings in year t) are matched with 
current audit quality (audit quality in year t), and the ratings and audit quality data should be matched on the same 
year, so firm-year observations for audit quality analyses run from 2007 to 2015, the same period as the ratings data. 
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inspection reports available online. Clients’ audit firm data were collected mainly from 
the Thomson Reuters Database. As the Thomson Reuters data have many missing 
values for audit firm information, missing data were hand-collected by matching the 
client with its corresponding annual reports. For the other control variables, data were 
collected from Datastream Worldscope. 
The initial sample focused on all UK-domiciled companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE). For all analyses, firm-years were excluded where: a) clients 
traded on the AIM market, b) clients were in the financial sector, c) clients did not have 
required audit firm data, d) clients were not domiciled in the UK, e) there were no data 
to measure the test variables, or f) there were no data to measure client-level control 
variables. In addition to these restrictions, for the audit fees analysis, when forming the 
test variable, observations were excluded where clients did not use the same audit firm 
between the current and prior years. 
Table 4.5 describes the sample selection process. The final sample has 2,156 firm-
year observations for the audit fees analysis, and 2,397 firm-year observations for the 
audit firm switching analysis. For the audit quality analysis, the final sample has 2,585 
firm-year observations for abnormal working capital accruals analysis, 2,636 for total 
accruals analysis, and 2,614 for audit opinion analysis. 
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Table 4.5: Sample selection process 
Panel A: Sample for audit fees analysis Observations 
Firm-year observations listed on LSE, 2007–2016 
Delete:  Total assets, sales or market value of equity zero 
14,294 
1,346 
Firm-year observations with fiscal-year changes 154 
Firm-year observations listed on AIM 7,788 
Firm-year observations from the financial sector 
Firm-year observations without audit firm data 
Firm-year observations with clients not domiciled in UK 
Firm-year observations without data to measure test variable 








Final sample for audit fees analysis, 2008-2016 2,156 
  
Panel B: Sample for audit firm switching analysis  Observations 
Firm-year observations listed on LSE, 2007–2016 
Delete: Total assets, sales or market value of equity zero 
14,294 
1,346 
Firm-year observations with fiscal-year changes 154 
Firm-year observations listed on AIM 7,788 
Firm-year observations from the financial sector 
Firm-year observations without audit firm data 
Firm-year observations with clients not domiciled in UK 
Firm-year observations without data to measure test variable 








Final sample for audit firm switch analysis 2008-2016 2,397 
  
Panel C: Sample for audit quality analysis Observations 
Firm-year observations listed on LSE, 2005–2016 
Delete: Total assets, sales or market value of equity zero 
19,772 
1,706 
Firm-year observations with fiscal-year changes 226 
Firm-year observations listed on AIM 12,206 
Firm-year observations from the financial sector 
Firm-year observations without audit firm data 
Firm-year observations with clients not domiciled in UK 





Firm-year observations without data to measure client control variables: 
Abnormal working capital accruals analysis (AWCA) 
Total accruals analysis 





Final sample for AWCA analysis 2007–2015 2,585 
Final sample for total accruals analysis 2007–2015 




Table 4.6: Composition of sample 
Panel A: By year 




Total Accruals Audit Opinion 
 N % N % N % N % N % 
2007 - - - - 296 11.45 301 11.42 295 11.29 
2008 246 11.41 279 11.64 348 13.46 353 13.39 350 13.39 
2009 279 12.94 319 13.31 318 12.30 323 12.25 320 12.24 
2010 270 12.52 295 12.31 280 10.83 287 10.89 286 10.94 
2011 247 11.46 268 11.18 293 11.33 302 11.46 301 11.51 
2012 251 11.64 280 11.68 305 11.80 313 11.87 311 11.90 
2013 249 11.55 266 11.10 269 10.41 276 10.47 274 10.48 
2014 249 11.55 266 11.10 357 13.81 362 13.73 359 13.73 
2015 281 13.03 323 13.48 119 4.60 119 4.51 118 4.51 
2016 84 3.90 101 4.21 - - - - - - 
Total 2,156  2,397  2,585  2,636  2,614  
Panel B: By audit firm 







 N % N % N % N % N % 
Deloitte  538 24.95 613 25.57 646 24.99 671 25.46 663 25.36 
E&Y  275 12.76 294 12.27 324 12.53 325 12.33 327 12.51 
KPMG  567 26.30 629 26.24 658 25.45 673 25.53 669 25.59 
PWC 711 32.98 780 32.54 848 32.80 856 32.47 855 32.71 
Baker Tilly 6 0.28 9 0.38 11 0.43 11 0.42 11 0.42 
BDO 26 1.21 34 1.42 48 1.86 50 1.90 44 1.68 
Crowe Clark  1 0.05 1 0.04 1 0.04 1 0.04 1 0.04 
Grant Thornton  27 1.25 31 1.29 43 1.66 43 1.63 38 1.45 
PKF 5 0.23 6 0.25 6 0.23 6 0.23 6 0.23 
Total 2,156  2,397  2,585  2,636  2,614  
Note: The sample period is 2008–2016 for audit fees analysis, and 2007–2015 for audit quality analysis. 
Table 4.6 provides an overview of the sample composition by year and audit firm 
(Panels A and B respectively) for all analyses. As expected, the sample size is evenly 
allocated, except in 2016 for the audit fees and audit firm switching samples, and in 
2015 for the audit quality sample.34 The sample size varies considerably between Big 
                                                 
34 For the audit fees and audit firm switching analyses, for the most recent inspection, the fiscal period ended in 
April 2015. In order to measure the impact of lagged rating on current audit fees, the audit fees data for 2016 can 
only be up to April, so 2016 has fewer observations than other years. Similarly, for audit quality analysis, current 
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4 audit firms and non-Big 4 audit firms, and the sample size for non-Big 4 audit firms 
is very limited, as in the case of Crowe Clark and PKF. 
Table 4.7 describes the firm-level variables used for all regression analyses. Panels 
A, B, C, D and E report the distributional properties of all variables in audit fees, audit 
firm switching, abnormal accruals, total accruals and audit opinion samples respectively. 
The mean values of AWCA, |AWCA| and TOT_ACCRUALS are 0.000, 0.038 and -0.048. 
Only 3.7 per cent of the sample switched audit firms, and 1.2 per cent received a 
qualified audit opinion for all firm-year observations. The mean value of audit fees is 
6.709. For PROC3, around 7–8 per cent of engagements were rated ‘Significant 
improvements required’, based on all firm-year observations. No multicollinearity 
issues are identified in untabulated results.35 
Table 4.7: Firm-level descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Audit fees sample (N=2,156) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
AUDFEE_RAW 2071.413 728.500 3878.603 
AUDFEE 6.709 6.591 1.302 
PROC3 0.076 0.071 0.057 
SIZE 13.551 13.379 1.818 
LOSS 0.172 0.000 0.378 
LEVERAGE 0.174 0.151 0.159 
BM 0.649 0.476 0.658 
CFO 0.094 0.088 0.080 
BUSY 0.502 1.000 0.500 
ROA 0.042 0.050 0.099 
LIQUIDITY 1.574 1.354 1.008 
NBS 1.105 1.099 0.544 
NGS 1.338 1.386 0.551 
FORSASLES 0.472 0.509 0.363 
                                                 
audit quality is matched with the current rating, so the data can only be up to April 2015; hence, 2015 has fewer 
observations for audit quality analysis. 
35 The only exception is ROA, which is positively correlated with CFO and negatively correlated with LOSS; the 
empirical findings remain unchanged after dropping ROA from the audit opinion and audit fees analyses. 
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Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
INVREC 0.276 0.252 0.187 
OPINION 0.013 0.000 0.111 









































Panel C: Abnormal working capital accruals sample (N=2,585) 
AWCA 0.000 0.001 0.054 
|AWCA| 0.038 0.023 0.045 
PROC3 0.077 0.071 0.060 
SIZE 13.366 13.216 1.850 
LOSS 0.173 0.000 0.378 
LAGGED_ACCRUALS -0.048 -0.039 0.075 
LEVERAGE 0.172 0.147 0.163 
BM 0.668 0.476 0.711 
CFO 0.089 0.086 0.086 
BUSY 0.501 1.000 0.500 
AGE 2.962 3.091 0.856 
SALES_GROWTH 0.073 0.049 0.205 
LITIGIOUS 0.241 0.000 0.428 
Panel D: Total accruals sample (N=2,636) 
TOT_ACCRUALS -0.048 -0.040 0.075 
PROC3 0.077 0.071 0.060 
SIZE 13.355 13.211 1.844 
LOSS 0.175 0.000 0.380 
LAGGED_ACCRUALS -0.048 -0.039 0.075 
LEVERAGE 0.173 0.147 0.163 
BM 0.678 0.480 0.720 
CFO 0.089 0.085 0.086 
BUSY 0.499 0.000 0.500 
AGE 2.960 3.091 0.860 
SALES_GROWTH 0.072 0.048 0.204 
LITIGIOUS 0.238 0.000 0.426 
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Panel E: Audit opinion sample (n=2,614) 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev 
OPINION 0.012 0.000 0.110 
PROC3 0.077 0.071 0.060 
SIZE 13.372 13.216 1.836 
ROA 0.040 0.050 0.102 
LOSS 0.174 0.000 0.379 
LEVERAGE 0.172 0.146 0.163 
BM 0.667 0.476 0.703 









LITIGIOUS 0.238 0.000 0.426 
Notes: Panels A, B, C, D and E describe all firm-level variables used in the regression analysis. The 
sample period is 2007–2015 for audit fees and audit firm switching analyses, and 2008–2016 for audit 
quality analysis. See Appendix 4 for definitions of all variables. All continuous variables are winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
4.4 Empirical findings 
This section presents findings on the impact of the latest available rating on current 
audit fees, the consequences of ratings for audit firm switching, and the association 
between ratings results and audit quality. 
4.4.1 FRC ratings and audit fees 
Table 4.8 reports the results of the audit fees analysis. In Model 1, the coefficient of 
PROC3 is positive and significant at the five per cent level. This indicates that if an 
audit firm has a higher proportion of deficient ratings in the last fiscal period, its current 
audit fees will increase. Specifically, a one per cent increase in deficient ratings will 
result in a 0.533 per cent audit fee premium or, in other words, the audit fee premium 
will be 5.33 per cent if the deficiency increase is 10 per cent. The control variables are 
generally significant and with signs consistent with the previous literature. Furthermore, 
the audit fees model has a high R-squared of 0.793. 
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Table 4.8: Impact of FRC ratings on audit fees 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
PROC3 0.533** (2.39) 0.533** (2.60) 0.380** (1.96) 
SIZE 0.582*** (33.69) 0.582*** (22.67) 0.543*** (8.61) 
LOSS 0.168*** (3.17) 0.168*** (3.79) -0.018 (-0.49) 
LEVERAGE -0.111 (-0.62) -0.111 (-0.51) -0.056 (-0.36) 
BM -0.142*** (-4.60) -0.142*** (-4.15) 0.012 (0.44) 
CFO -0.164 (-0.56) -0.164 (-0.48) -0.245 (-0.99) 
BUSY 0.183*** (3.60) 0.183** (3.11) 0.183 (1.44) 
LIQUIDITY -0.076*** (-2.72) -0.076*** (-1.45) -0.013 (-0.47) 
ROA -0.323 (-1.25) -0.323* (-1.89) -0.740*** (-3.53) 
NBS 0.154*** (4.27) 0.154*** (3.17) 0.010 (0.34) 
NGS 0.184*** (3.86) 0.184** (2.60) 0.020 (0.60) 
FORSALES 0.648*** (7.84) 0.648*** (6.60) 0.240*** (3.02) 
INVREC 0.522*** (3.08) 0.522 (1.47) 0.680* (1.72) 
OPINION 0.295*** (3.09) 0.295** (2.71) 0.202*** (3.08) 
INTERCEPT -2.665*** (-6.32) -2.665*** (-6.54) -1.005 (-1.13) 
Industry FE YES YES NO 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Client FE NO NO YES 
Audit Firm FE YES YES YES 
N 2,156 2,156 2,156 
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.793 0.910 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates from regression analyses, showing the average effect 
of the rating result (i.e. rating in year t-1) on audit fees (i.e. audit fees in year t). The sample period is 
2008–2016 (calendar year). See Appendix 4 for definitions of all variables. All continuous variables are 
winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. In Models 1 and 3, t-statistics are reported in italics based on 
client clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. In Model 2, t-statistics are based on 
industry clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
Models 2 and 3 repeat the analysis of baseline Model 1, but employ alternative 
clustering approaches and fixed effects. Specifically, in Model 2, Model 1 is repeated 
using industry-clustered standard errors, and in Model 3, industry-fixed effects are 
replaced with client-fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the client level. In 
both cases, the baseline findings remain unchanged. 
The robustness of the main findings reported in Table 4.8 was assessed through a 
series of additional tests using baseline Model 1 (see Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9: Robustness tests for audit fees analysis 
Independent variables 
Alternative definition of 
rating 




cross-listed in US 
Further lags 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PROC3t-1 - - - 0.215* (1.93) 0.619** (2.51) 0.715** (2.36) 
PROC3_LAGGED - - - - - -0.184 (-0.69) 
DIFFERENCE_1 0.081*** (2.93) - - - - - 
PROC2At-1 - 0.015 (0.15) - - - - 
PROC2Bt-1 - - -0.100 (-1.07) - - - 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,156 2,156 2,156 3,811 1,672 1,524 
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.793 0.793 0.843 0.710 0.789 
Notes: This table reports a number of sensitivity tests using baseline Model 1 in Table 4.8. Model 1 uses an alternative definition of the rating variable, DIFFERENCE_1, which 
is a dummy variable and is equal to 1 if PROC3 is above or equal to the mean value of PROC3 for all audit firms and years in the sample, and 0 otherwise. Models 2 and 3 test 
the impact of PROC2A and PROC2B on audit fees respectively: PROC2A is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2A ratings (good with limited improvements 
required) in the total audit engagements reviewed for a specific year; and PROC2B is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2B ratings (improvements required) 
in the total audit engagements reviewed for a specific year. Model 4 includes all AIM companies in the sample. Model 5 excludes all firm-year observations cross listed in the 
US. Model 6 tests the impact of PROC3 and PROC3_LAGGED on audit fees: PROC3_LAGGED is the proportion of engagements rated ‘Significant improvements required’ 
(Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit firm for the fiscal period two years previously. AUDFEE is the natural log of audit fees in thousands of GBP. 
PROC3 is the proportion of engagements rated ‘Significant improvements required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit firm for a specific year. See 
Appendix 4 for definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are based on client clusters and 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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For brevity, the results are presented only for variables of interest, although the full set 
of controls described earlier is included in all models. On the whole, these are robust to 
alternative research design choices. 
First, the sensitivity of the findings to alternative ways of constructing rating 
variables is assessed. Specifically, a dummy variable (i.e. DIFFERENCE) is used, equal 
to 1 if PROC3 is above or equal to the mean value of PROC3 based on all audit firms 
and years in the sample, and 0 otherwise. This dummy variable allows for determination 
of whether it makes a difference if the proportion of lower ratings is above or below the 
audit industry average. The results in Table 4.9 (column 1) show that DIFFERENCE is 
still positive and significant, which indicates that the proportion of lower ratings may 
have a significant impact on audit fees if it is above the industry average. 
Second, in order to observe the impact of other rating scales on audit fees, PROC3 
is replaced with PROC2A and PROC2B in Models 2 and 3 respectively. Specifically, 
PROC2A is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2A ratings (good with 
limited improvements required) in the total audit engagements reviewed for a specific 
year, and PROC2B is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2B ratings 
(improvements required) in the total audit engagements reviewed for a specific year. 
The results shown in Table 4.9 (columns 2 and 3) reveal no significant impact on audit 
fees of using the other rating scales. These results indicate that only extremely low 
ratings (i.e. PROC3) have a significant impact on audit fees. 
Third, as discussed earlier, a small proportion of AIM companies fall within the 
FRC’s inspection regime, so in order to measure the impact of companies listed in this 
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market, AIM companies are included in the sample to observe whether the result 
persists. The results in Column 4 show that PROC3 is still positive and significant at 
the 10 per cent level (coefficient of PROC3 = 0.215; t-statistic = 1.93). However, both 
the coefficient and t-statistic are lower than in the baseline model in Table 4.8. This is 
probably because the FRC’s inspection sample is mainly from the LSE’s main market. 
Fourth, clients cross-listed on a US stock exchange and hence subject to SEC regulation 
are excluded, and again, the primary results remain qualitatively unchanged (see 
Column 5). 
Finally, in order to observe the impact of inspections completed more than one 
year ago, the analysis is repeated while adding another rating variable 
PROC3_LAGGED, which is the proportion of engagements rated ‘Significant 
improvements required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit 
firm for the fiscal period two years previously. The results in Column 6 show that 
PROC3 is still positive and significant at the five per cent level, whereas the coefficient 
of PROC3_LAGGED is insignificant. This suggests that inspections completed two 
years ago do not significantly affect current audit fees. 
In general, if an audit firm has a higher proportion of low ratings during the 
previous fiscal period, its current audit fees will increase, and this finding is robust to a 
series of research design choices. 
Tests were also conducted to establish whether audit fee premiums differ between 
larger and smaller audit firms. Specifically, audit fee premiums are expected to be more 
evident among larger audit firms. Previous studies (e.g. Choi et al. 2008; DeFond and 
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Zhang 2014) show that reputational costs increase with audit firm size, and that large 
audit firms have deep pockets that may be targeted by shareholders in litigation claims. 
Thus, if an unfavourable rating is received, large audit firms have stronger incentives 
to improve audit quality (i.e. greater audit effort) to mitigate litigation risks. 
Table 4.10: Heterogeneity tests 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) 
PROC3_BIG4 0.586** (2.31) 0.586** (2.59) 0.422* (1.84) 
PROC3_NON-BIG4 0.348 (0.86) 0.348 (0.62) 0.205 (0.73) 
SIZE 0.582*** (33.67) 0.582*** (22.66) 0.544*** (8.62) 
LOSS 0.167*** (3.16) 0.167*** (3.79) -0.017 (-0.48) 
LEVERAGE -0.111 (-0.62) -0.111 (-0.51) -0.056 (-0.36) 
BM -0.142*** (-4.59) -0.142*** (-4.08) 0.012 (0.45) 
CFO -0.165 (-0.56) -0.165 (-0.48) -0.243 (-0.98) 
BUSY 0.183*** (3.60) 0.183** (3.11) 0.183 (1.43) 
LIQUIDITY -0.075*** (-2.71) -0.075 (-1.44) -0.013 (-0.47) 
ROA -0.322 (-1.25) -0.322* (-1.88) -0.738*** (-3.52) 
NBS 0.154*** (4.25) 0.154*** (3.17) 0.009 (0.32) 
NGS 0.183*** (3.86) 0.183** (2.60) 0.020 (0.60) 
FORSALES 0.648*** (7.84) 0.648*** (6.61) 0.241*** (3.02) 
INVREC 0.523*** (3.08) 0.523 (1.47) 0.679* (1.71) 
OPINION 0.294*** (3.09) 0.294** (2.72) 0.201*** (3.07) 
BIG4 1.184*** (5.76) 1.184*** (5.31) -0.139 (-0.70) 
INTERCEPT -3.226*** (-11.71) -3.226*** (-6.25) -0.737 (-0.81) 
Industry FE YES YES NO 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Audit Firm FE YES YES YES 
Client FE NO NO YES 
N 2,156 2,156 2,156 
Adjusted R2 0.793 0.793 0.910 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates from further heterogeneity analysis. It distinguishes 
between companies with or without a Big 4 audit firm (PROC3_BIG4 and PROC3_NON-BIG4). The 
sample period is 2008–2016 (calendar year). See Appendix 1 for definitions of all variables. All 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Models 1 and 3 report (in italics) t-
statistics based on client clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. Model 2 reports t-
statistics based on industry clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
Moreover, in an oligopolistic audit market, especially for large audit firms, where 
clients potentially have less choice, the likelihood of audit firms passing on increased 
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costs through fees is greater. 
As shown in Table 4.10, using a Big 4 indicator, all observations were split into 
two non-overlapping groups of companies with Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit firms. The 
coefficients for PROC3_BIG4 and PROC3_NON-BIG4 show the effect of FRC ratings 
on audit fees for companies with Big 4 audit firms and non-Big 4 audit firms, 
respectively. As shown in Model 1 of Table 4.10, PROC3_BIG4 is positive (0.586) and 
significant at the five per cent level, while PROC3_NON-BIG4 is insignificant but still 
positive, and of smaller economic magnitude. In Model 2, the analysis is repeated using 
industry-clustered standard errors, and in Model 3, industry-fixed effects are replaced 
with client-fixed effects. There is no qualitative change in the results of either model. 
Overall, the results show that audit fee premiums are more concentrated in companies 
with Big 4 audit firms. 
4.4.2 FRC ratings and audit firm switching 
Table 4.11 reports the results of audit firm switching (SWITCH) analysis using logit 
regression. In Model 1, the coefficient of PROC3 is insignificant, indicating that FRC 
ratings do not significantly affect audit committees’ decisions on audit firm 
appointments. With respect to the control variables, the results indicate that audit firm 
switching is more common for larger companies.36 The pseudo-R2 is 5.4 per cent, 
which is similar to the previous literature (e.g. Weber et al. 2008). In Model 2, the 
                                                 
36 Similarly to Weber et al. (2008), which is based on a unique German setting, most control variables in the audit 
firm switching analysis are insignificant, probably because the UK and Germany have fewer observations than US 
studies, so a relatively low frequency of audit firm switching may weaken the power of the test. 
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analysis is repeated using industry-clustered standard errors, and the results do not 
change qualitatively.37 
Table 4.11: Audit firm switching analysis 
Independent variables (1) (2) 
PROC3 -0.557 (-0.22) -0.557 (-0.22) 
SIZE 0.147** (2.04) 0.147* (1.73) 
%SIZE -0.473 (-0.76) -0.473 (-0.83) 
LEVERAGE 0.399 (0.57) 0.399 (0.58) 
%LEVERAGE 1.118 (0.65) 1.118 (0.67) 
ROA -0.426 (-0.24) -0.426 (-0.22) 
LOSS -0.680 (-1.40) -0.680 (-1.38) 
OPINION 0.191 (0.20) 0.191 (0.19) 
INVREC 0.504 (0.78) 0.504 (1.23) 
INTERCEPT -4.739*** (-4.11) -4.739*** (-3.81) 
Industry FE YES YES 
Year FE YES YES 
Audit Firm FE YES YES 
N 2,387 2,387 
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 
Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates from audit firm switching analysis. The sample period 
is 2008–2016 (calendar year). SWITCH is equal to 1 if a client changed audit firm between the previous 
(t-1) and current (t) year, and 0 otherwise. PROC3 is the proportion of engagements rated ‘Significant 
Improvements Required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit firm for a specific 
year. See Appendix 4 for definitions of all other variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Models 1 (2) report (in italics) t-statistics based on client (industry) clusters and 
heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
Similarly to the audit fee analysis, additional robustness tests were performed, 
using an alternative definition of PROC3, the impact of other rating scales, the inclusion 
of AIM companies and the exclusion of client cross-listing in the US (see Table 4.12). 
                                                 
37 Some observations in the audit firm switching analysis were dropped when running the regression because some 
audit firm indicators perfectly predict the dependent dummy variable. As a sensitivity test, audit firm-fixed effects 
were dropped from the baseline model, and the result did not change qualitatively. 
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Table 4.12 Robustness tests for audit firm switching analysis 
Independent variables Alternative definition of rating Other rating scales Including AIM companies 
Excluding clients 
cross-listed in US 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
PROC3 - - - -0.090 (-0.07) 0.765 (0.27) 
DIFFERENCE_1 0.222 (0.62) - - - - 
PROC2A - 1.322 (1.27) - - - 
PROC2B - - -1.298 (-1.25) - - 
Control variables YES YES YES YES YES 
N 2,387 2,387 2,387 4,342 1,827 
Pseudo R2 0.055 0.057 0.056 0.036 0.039 
Notes: This table reports a number of sensitivity tests using baseline Model 1 in Table 4.11. In Model 1 uses an alternative definition of the rating variable, DIFFERENCE_1; 
this is a dummy variable equal to 1 if PROC3 is above or equal to the mean value of PROC3 based on all audit firms and years in the sample, and 0 otherwise. Models 2 and 3 
test for the impact of PROC2A and PROC2B on audit firm switching respectively: PROC2A is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2A ratings (good with limited 
improvements required) in the total audit engagements reviewed for a specific year; and PROC2B is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2B ratings (improvements 
required) in the total audit engagements reviewed for a specific year. Model 4 includes all AIM companies in the sample. Model 5 excludes all firm-year observations cross 
listed in the US. SWITCH is equal to 1 if a client changed audit firm between the previous (t-1) and current (t) year, and 0 otherwise. PROC3 is the proportion of engagements 
rated ‘Significant improvements required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit firm for a specific year. See Appendix 4 for definitions of all other 
variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are based on client clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
 
 119 
The findings in Table 4.12 38  reveal that the main inferences do not change 
qualitatively. Further testing was carried out to establish whether additional control 
variables might affect the results, including cash (CASH), accruals quality (AWCA) and 
client–audit firm mismatch (MISMATCH) (e.g. Boone et al. 2015; Wieczynska 2016). 
Definitions of these variables can be found in Appendix 4. Untabulated results indicate 
that the basic results did not change qualitatively. 
4.4.3 FRC rating and audit quality 
Table 4.13 reports the results of audit quality analysis, beginning with analysis of 
abnormal accruals (absolute and signed values). As shown in the table, PROC3 is 
insignificant in both cases. The control variables are generally significant and in a 
direction consistent with previous research. For example, larger and older clients, and 
clients with higher book-to-market ratios and cash flows from operating activities have 
lower levels of abnormal accruals. Next, the analysis is repeated for total accruals, using 
the same controls as previously. Similarly to the abnormal accruals analysis, PROC3 is 
not significant in the total accruals model. Finally, audit opinion is analysed. Similarly 
to the other three audit quality proxies, PROC3 is insignificant. In addition, Model 2 
repeats Model 1 using industry-clustered standard errors, and Model 3 replaces 
industry-fixed effects with client-fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the client 
level.39 In all cases, the baseline findings remain unchanged. 
                                                 
38 The test for lagged inspection performed in the audit fees analysis was not included because the construction of 
PROC3 and PROC3_LAGGED reduces variation in SWITCH. After creating PROC3 and PROC3_LAGGED, only 
one firm-year observation had switched audit firms between years. 
39 For audit opinion analysis, many observations were dropped when running the regression because some industry 
and audit firm indicators perfectly predict the dependent dummy variable. 
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Table 4.13: Audit quality analysis 
Independent variables |AWCA| AWCA TOT_ACCRUALS OPINION 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) 
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Notes: This table reports the coefficient estimates from the regression analysis, showing the association between the current rating result (rating in year t) and current audit 
quality (audit quality in year t). The sample period is 2007–2015 (calendar year). AWCA (|AWCA|) are the abnormal (absolute) working capital accruals scaled by lagged total 
assets, based on DeFond and Park (2001). TOT_ACCRUALS is the difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations, scaled by lagged 
total assets. OPINION is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the client receives a qualified audit opinion; and 0 otherwise. PROC3 is the proportion of engagements rated 
‘Significant improvements required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit firm for a specific year. See Appendix 4 for definitions of all other variables. 
All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Models 1 and 3 report t-statistics (or z-statistics) based on client clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected 
standard errors. Model 2 reports t-statistics (or z-statistics) based on industry clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Table 4.14: Robustness tests for audit quality analysis 
Panel A: Alternative definition of rating 








DIFFERENCE 0.001 (0.55) 0.004 (1.20) 0.003 (0.92) -0.517 (-1.33) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
N 2,585 2,585 2,636 1,439 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.150 0.095 0.503 0.147 
Panel B: Other rating scales (1) 








PROC2A 0.006 (0.78) 0.009 (1.04) 0.004 (0.53) 1.265 (0.78) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
N 2,585 2,585 2,636 1,439 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.151 0.094 0.503 0.146 
Panel C: Other rating scales (2) 










-0.015* (-1.74) -0.007 (-0.88) -0.560 (-0.39) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
N 2,585 2,585 2,636 1,439 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.151 0.095 0.503 0.145 
Panel D: Including AIM companies 








PROC3 0.026 (1.39) 0.032 (1.49) 0.009 (0.42) 0.144 (0.12) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
N 4,694 4,694 4,812 4,651 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.362 0.059 0.248 0.258 
Panel E: Excluding clients cross-listed in US 








PROC3 0.019 (1.08) 0.025 (1.01) 0.017 (0.68) -4.764 (-1.41) 
Control variables YES YES YES YES 
N 2,030 2,030 2,081 1,150 
Adj. R2/Pseudo R2 0.159 0.108 0.490 0.131 
Table 4.14 reports a number of sensitivity tests using baseline Model 1 in Table 4.13. The sample period is 
2007–2015.Panel A uses an alternative definition of rating variable, DIFFERENCE, which is a dummy 
variable and is equal to 1 if PROC3 is above or equal to the mean value of PROC3 based on all audit firms 
and years in the sample, and 0 otherwise. Panels B and C test the impact of PROC2A and PROC2B on audit 
quality: PROC2A is the proportion of audit engagements with category 2A ratings (good with limited 
improvements required) in the total audit engagements being reviewed for a specific year; PROC2B is the 
proportion of audit engagements with category 2B ratings (improvements required) in the total audit 
engagements being reviewed for a specific year. Panel D includes all AIM companies in the sample. Panel E 
excludes all firm-year observations cross-listed in the US. AWCA (|AWCA|) are the abnormal (absolute) 
working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets, based on DeFond and Park (2001). TOT_ACCRUALS 
is the difference between net income before extraordinary items and cash flow from operations scaled by 
lagged total assets. OPINION is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the client receives a qualified audit opinion; 
and 0 otherwise. PROC3 is the proportion of engagements rated ‘Significant improvements required’ 
(Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for a specific year. See Appendix 4 for definitions of all other 
variables. All continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. T-statistics are based on 
client clusters and heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed test). 
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Similarly to the audit fees and audit firm switching analysis, a series of robustness 
tests was performed. As shown in Table 4.14, the findings generally do not change 
qualitatively. Overall, the findings suggest that FRC ratings are not useful for 
distinguishing between high- and low-quality audits. This is consistent with the results of 
the audit firm switching analysis, and to some extent explains why inspection results do 
not affect audit committees’ audit firm appointment decisions. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This study examines the costs and benefits arising from the FRC’s issuance of overall 
quality ratings. Based on a large sample of UK-listed clients, a significant increase in audit 
fees is found when the audit firm has a higher proportion of engagements with deficient 
ratings, probably arising from the additional effort and resources needed to meet the FRC’s 
requirements. This significant increase in audit fees is more concentrated among clients 
with Big 4 audit firms, because the latter have greater concerns for reputation and ‘deep 
pockets’ which may be targetted by shareholders. However, there is no evidence to suggest 
that FRC ratings may affect clients’ likelihood of switching audit firms, and no significant 
relationship is found between FRC ratings and audit quality. The results suggest that FRC 
ratings are not perceived by audit committees as a signal of audit quality, and that the 
inspection results do not distinguish between high- and low-quality audits. Possible reasons 
for this are FRC inspectors’ lack of expertise and experience, their risk-based inspection 
approach, and inappropriate focus in their inspections. 
Overall, this study provides evidence that the audit inspection regime in the UK brings 
additional costs to both clients and audit firms, while failing to bring corresponding 
benefits. This conclusion is consistent with the view that public oversight may be focused 
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on documentation and compliance rather than on a holistic assessment of audit quality (i.e. 
Beattie et al. 2013; Boone et al. 2015). However, this study is subject to some limitations. 
These include the low power of audit firm switching analysis, possibly due to the limited 
number of observations, and with regard to the audit quality analysis, the inability of the 
audit quality proxies used in extant archival studies to capture the quality of audit 
engagements undertaken by audit firms. In general, this study provides a starting point for 
further research and provides potentially useful insights for policy makers and national 
audit firm regulators. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated the costs and benefits of public oversight of the audit profession 
in Europe. First, it has provided a detailed review of the legislative development of public 
oversight in Europe, as well as of the literature on public oversight systems. The 
consequences for audit pricing and quality of the inspection regime have been examined 
on both a pan-European level and exclusively in the UK. In general, this thesis contributes 
to the literature on audit regulation and has implications for the future policy making of 
auditing regulators. 
Chapter 2 began by reviewing the legislative development of public oversight both 
before and after the publication of Directive 2006/43/EC. Prior to 2006, due to a flurry of 
accounting scandals in the early twenty-first century, the EC was already considering the 
establishment of a harmonised oversight structure for the audit profession. This included 
its establishment of the Committee on Auditing in 1998, its release of the 
‘Recommendation on Quality Assurance for the Statutory Audit in the European Union: 
Minimum Requirements’ in 2000 and its ‘Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament Reinforcing Statutory Audit in the EU’ for the audit 
profession in 2003. However, as there was no mandatory requirement for the 
implementation of public oversight systems, various oversight structures for quality 
assurance over the audit profession were in place across Europe. These were mainly of 
three types: (a) professionally self-regulated or peer-reviewed, (b) governmental public 
oversight, and (c) mixed or unclearly defined oversight systems. Most countries did not 
have a tradition of public oversight, having had long-standing self-regulated or peer-review 
systems in which the audit profession played a significant supervisory role. Only a minority 
of countries had systems of governmental public oversight, or mixed or unclearly defined 
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oversight systems. 
In order to harmonise oversight systems across Europe, in 2006, Directive 
2006/43/EC was published and a public oversight system implemented across the European 
Union. Each EU member state was then required to establish a system of public oversight 
over the audit profession. The Directive has been useful in reinforcing regulation over the 
auditing profession and achieving a uniformly high quality of auditing services in all EU 
member states, which may strengthen investors’ and other stakeholders’ confidence in 
financial reporting. However, as the Directive only provides basic principles and minimum 
requirements for organising public oversight, and permits considerable differences in the 
design of quality assurance systems, there is great flexibility for member states to translate 
this provision and design their own POAs, resulting in a heterogeneity of POA designs in 
Europe. 
Since the release of Directive 2006/43/EC, the EC has taken further steps to refine 
and detail the shape of public oversight. These include the publication of the 2008 
Recommendation and Directive 2014/56/EU. The 2008 Recommendation focuses 
specifically on quality assurance of public interest entities, and defines certain important 
terms in greater detail. In Directive 2014/56/EU, most criteria remain unchanged relative 
to Directive 2006/43/EC (FEE, 2014), but there are some changes relevant to quality 
assurance. These include the frequency of quality assurance reviews, further requirements 
for quality assurance reviewers, delegation of oversight powers, further requirements for 
sanctions, and cooperation of audit oversight bodies and supervision. Compared with 
Directive 2006/43/EC, the new Directive provides greater transparency and predictability 
of requirements pertaining to audit firms, increasing investors’ confidence in the credibility 
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of financial reporting and improving mutual cooperation between competent authorities in 
each member state. However, it is still too early to claim that the new Directive is entirely 
successful, and further evidence is needed to evaluate its efficiency and effectiveness. 
Overall, the development of audit regulation from the early twenty-first century ended 
an era of self-regulation in the audit profession and implemented public oversight across 
Europe, and the EC appears to be aiming progressively to improve the public oversight 
system. 
The review of previous literature in Chapter 2 addresses a broad stream of literature 
on the effects of regulation and cost-benefit analyses, based on Leuz and Wysocki (2016), 
as well as studies specifically on public oversight of the audit profession. Primary studies 
of public oversight began in the last decade, and most have been based on the US. Within 
the US studies, some support the current public oversight system and consider that the 
PCAOB inspection regime may increase audit quality and be beneficial to the various 
stakeholders, including audit clients and investors. However, other studies point out the 
regime’s weaknesses and claim that it is ineffective and does not bring corresponding 
benefits. Apart from studies of the advantages and disadvantages of the PCAOB, other US 
studies analyse the quality assurance system from other angles, and in addition to studies 
based in the US, a small number of studies analyse the quality assurance systems of non-
US settings. In addition, a few regulation studies provide cost-benefit analyses. Overall, 
there is no conclusive determination of the efficiency and effectiveness of public oversight 
in the US, and further research is still needed on public oversight systems, especially in 
institutional settings outside the US. 
Having reviewed the legislative development in Europe and previous literature, 
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Chapter 3 has presented a study of the public oversight system at a pan-European level, 
looking specifically at the implications for audit pricing and audit quality of different ways 
of designing public audit oversight, in terms of membership, powers and the content of 
inspection reports. Based on a large international sample of listed firms from 24 EU 
countries over the 2005–2013 period, as well as hand-collected information from various 
sources, significant heterogeneity is identified in the design of public audit oversight across 
the EU. In particular, almost 46 per cent of the sample regulatory authorities for audit firms 
consist entirely of non-practitioners or provide overall quality ratings in their inspection 
reports, while 79 per cent of public oversight bodies have concentrated power. 
Multivariate regression analyses using audit fees and three proxies for audit quality 
reveal a significant increase in audit fees following the adoption of public oversight, 
specifically in countries where all members of the oversight body are non-practitioners or 
where the national audit firm regulator has full responsibility for inspection, investigation 
and discipline. However, contrary to audit fees, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
quality of audit engagements is affected by specific features of the public oversight system. 
A possible explanation for this finding is that many aspects of the new inspection regime 
are largely process- and compliance-driven, with high costs for limited benefits (Boone et 
al. 2015; Christensen et al. 2016). However, this result may also be due to the inability of 
commonly-used audit quality proxies to detect any differences in audit quality (DeFond 
and Zhang 2014). Overall, this study is the first to generate evidence regarding the 
implications of alternative external audit regulation designs for audit pricing and quality, 
and contributes to long-standing debate over the relative merits of monitoring by 
experienced practitioners or by independent non-practitioners. 
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Having investigated the oversight system at a pan-European level, the study presented 
in Chapter 4 focuses specifically on the UK. As the FRC provides summary scores for audit 
quality in its inspection reports, this study examines FRC ratings and measures their costs 
and benefits for audit firms. First, the impact of rating on audit fees is measured. Using a 
large sample of UK-listed clients for the period 2008–2016, a significant increase in audit 
fees is found when an audit firm has a higher proportion of engagements with lower ratings. 
Specifically, a 10 per cent increase in deficient ratings will generate a 5.33 per cent audit 
fee premium. A possible explanation for this result is that audit firms may have to expend 
greater effort and resources to adjust their audit procedures to avoid punishment or other 
enforcement measures by oversight authorities (e.g. Acito et al. 2013; DeFond and Lennox 
2017). In an oligopolistic audit market, the audit firm passes on incremental costs to its 
clients, which increases audit fees (Lyon and Maher 2005; Boone et al. 2015). This increase 
is more concentrated among clients with Big 4 audit firms, perhaps because the latter have 
higher reputational costs and deep pockets that may be targeted by shareholders in litigation 
claims. 
This study also investigates the impact of inspection ratings on audit firm switching, 
proxied by the likelihood of switching audit firms between years. Unlike for audit fees, no 
evidence is found to suggest that ratings may affect clients’ likelihood of switching audit 
firms. This indicates that FRC ratings are not perceived by audit committees as a signal of 
audit quality, and thus do not affect their audit firm appointment decisions. 
Finally, the study examines the association between FRC ratings and audit quality, 
proxied by abnormal accruals, total accruals and the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit 
opinion. Consistent with the results for audit firm switching, no significant relationship is 
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found between FRC ratings and audit quality, thus confirming that rating results may not 
be a signal of audit quality. Possible explanations for this finding are the FRC’s lack of 
expertise and independence, its risk-based inspection approach and its focus on 
documentation and compliance rather than on a holistic assessment of audit quality (Beattie 
et al. 2013; Boone et al. 2015). 
Overall, this study reveals that unfavourable inspection results may prompt audit firms 
to undertake more adjustments to their auditing procedures to meet FRC requirements 
(which will increase the cost of audits), but audit committees may not treat this inspection 
result seriously, believing that the results may not be credible and do not reflect the general 
quality of audits. Their opinions are evidenced by a lack of association between inspection 
ratings and several audit quality proxies. In general, Chapter 4 provides evidence that the 
audit inspection regime in the UK brings additional costs to both clients and audit firms, 
while failing to bring corresponding benefits. 
Both empirical chapters find an increase in audit pricing with no apparent impact on 
audit quality in association with the audit inspection practice. This indicates that the 
inspection regime in Europe may potentially bring additional costs to audit firms and 
clients, while perhaps not generating corresponding benefits. 
The results of this thesis have several implications for policy makers and regulators. 
First, it provides evidence on POA design regarding membership and power concentration, 
which are relevant in light of recent developments in Directive 2014 that shed light on the 
expertise and independence of reviewers and the delegation of oversight powers 
(2014/56/EU, article 1. para. 24(b); 2014/56/EU, article 32(4)(b)). Specifically, the results 
of this thesis suggest that it is potentially more efficient to allow more practitioners to 
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participate in the POA, and to delegate some of the POA’s powers to other institutions. 
Second, this thesis sets out evidence on the costs and benefits of providing overall quality 
ratings. For POAs that already provide overall quality ratings in their inspection reports 
(e.g. the FRC), the issues highlighted in this thesis may potentially be helpful in developing 
further policies and refining their audit inspections in the future. For example, it may be 
necessary to consider adjusting the traditional risk-based inspection approach, and 
inspectors may need to pay greater attention to audit outcomes rather than procedural 
compliance and adequacy. POAs around the world that do not as yet provide overall quality 
ratings in their inspection reports (e.g. the PCAOB) need to give careful consideration to 
the aforementioned issues before deciding whether to do so. Overall, the results of this 
thesis are potentially useful for policy makers and regulators around the world. 
This thesis is also subject to limitations. First, as previously discussed, inability to 
detect any differences in audit quality in both empirical chapters may be attributable to the 
potentially limited suitability of commonly-used audit quality proxies for measuring the 
amount of assurance provided by audit firms (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Second, as 
indicated in Chapter 3, audit fees data from Worldscope refer to both auditing and non-
auditing services (NAS); accordingly, it is infeasible to examine the relationship between 
audit fees and NAS fees as well as the differential impact of inspection ratings on these 
two measures. Third, in the audit switching analysis, many control variables in the model 
are found to be insignificant, probably because the small number of observations and small 
variation in the dependent variable weaken the power of the test. Fourth, in addition to 
membership, power concentration and transparency, other design features of POAs may 
potentially affect audit firms’ or clients’ incentives. Fifth, this thesis focuses on the 
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consequences of public oversight for audit pricing, audit firm switching and audit quality; 
it does not examine capital market consequences, as does at least one previous US study 
which claims that the introduction of the PCAOB has affected the capital market (Gipper 
et al. 2015). Finally, this dissertation focuses specifically on Europe. Whether the results 
can be applied to other institutional settings around the world (e.g. emerging markets) is as 
yet unknown. These issues provide a useful starting point for further research. 
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Appendix 1: Variable definitions for pan-European study 
(with Worldscope item numbers in square parentheses) 
Dependent variables  
AUDFEE_RAW Audit fees in thousands of US$ [WS01801]. 
AUDFEE Natural log of audit fees in thousands of US$ [WS01801]. 
AWCA Abnormal working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets 
[WC02999] based on DeFond and Park (2001). Abnormal working 
capital accruals are calculated as Working Capitalt – (Working Capitalt-
1/Salest-1 [WC01001] * Salest [WC01001]). 
Working Capital equals (current assets [WC02201] – cash and short 
term investment [WC02001]) – (current liability [WC03101] – short-
term debt and current portion of long-term debt [WC03051]). 
OPINION Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm receives a qualified audit 
opinion [WS07546], and 0 otherwise. 
Variables of interest  
MEMBERSHIP Dummy variable referring to firms in countries where all POA board 
members are non-practitioners (POA composition). It equals 1 for all 
observations ending on or after the national law became effective, and 
0 otherwise. 
POWER  Dummy variable referring to firms in countries where the POA is 
responsible for all three functions of inspection, investigation and 
disciplinary (POA power concentration). It equals 1 for all observations 
ending on or after the national law became effective, and 0 otherwise. 
RATING Dummy variable referring to firms in countries where inspection reports 
provide overall ratings of the quality of the audit firms being reviewed 
(content of inspection reports). It equals 1 for all observations ending 
on or after the national law became effective, and 0 otherwise. 
Firm-specific controls  
AGE The natural log of the age of the client, which is the number of years 
since the client was listed [BDATE]. 
BIG4 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm uses one of the Big 4 audit 
firms [WS07800], and 0 otherwise. 
BM Book value of equity [WC03501] scaled by market value of equity 
[WC08001]. 
BUSY Dummy variable that equals 1 for fiscal year ending 31 December 
[WS05350], and 0 otherwise. 
CFO Cash flow from operations [WC04860] scaled by total assets 
[WC02999].  
FORSALES Ratio of foreign sales to total sales [WS08731]. 
INVREC Ratio of the sum of inventories [WS02101] and receivables [WS02051] 
to total assets [WS02999]. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of long-term debt [WS03251] to total assets [WS02999]. 
LIQUIDITY Ratio of current assets [WS02201] to current liabilities [WS03101]. 
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LITIGIOUS Dummy variable that equals 1 if SIC [WS07021, WS07022, WS07023] 
is 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, or 7370–7374 
(biotechnology, computers, electronics or retailing), and 0 otherwise.  
LOSS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports a net loss [WS01651] 
in the current year, and 0 otherwise. 
NBS Natural log of 1 plus the number of business segments [WS19501, 
WS19511, WS19521, WS19531, WS19541, WS19551, WS19561, 
WS19571, WS19581, WS19591].  
NGS Natural log of 1 plus the number of geographical segments [WS19601, 
WS19611, WS19621, WS19631, WS19641, WS19651, WS19661, 
WS19671, WS19681, WS19691]. 
ROA Ratio of net income before extraordinary items [WC01551] to total 
assets [WS02999]. 
SALES_GROWTH Sales increase (or decrease) from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged 
sales [WC01001]. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets in thousands of US$ [WS07230]. 
Country-specific controls 
GDP Gross domestic product in current US$ (World Bank). The natural log 
of GDP is used in the empirical analysis. 
GDP_PER_CAP Gross domestic product per capita in current US$ (World Bank). 




2, where N is the total number of all audit firms within 
a country, s is the size of each audit firm measured by total audit fees 
earned [WS01801], and S is the size of the total audit market of the 
country. Higher values denote higher market concentration. 
RULE The rule of law from World Bank Governance Indicators, based on 




Appendix 2: Data sources for construction of POA variables 
Country MEMBERSHIP POWER RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE YEAR 
Austria IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR(2013) 
Belgium IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
POA Annual Report (2012) 
Correspondence via telephone 
IFIAR(2013) 




Correspondence via email IFIAR(2013) 
Czech Republic IFIAR (2014) 
Correspondence via email 
EC(2010) Correspondence via email IFIAR(2014) 
Denmark  IFIAR (2013) 




Correspondence via email DCCA (2011) 
Finland IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
 
France IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
 
Germany IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
 
Greece IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
 
Hungary IFIAR (2013) EC (2010) Correspondence via telephone IFIAR (2013) 
Iceland POA website and other online 
sources42 
POA website Correspondence via email POA website43 
 




POA Annual Report (2011) IFIAR (2013) 
POA Annual Report (2006) 
Italy IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
 
Lithuania IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
                                                 
40 The relevant link is: http://cposa.bg/en/index.php/aboutthecommission/membership. 
41 The relevant links are: https://danishbusinessauthority.dk/who-we-are and https://www.linkedin.com (exact LinkedIn links available on request). 
42 The relevant link is: http://www.endurskodendarad.is/ (the other online links are available on request). 
43 The relevant link is: http://www.althingi.is/lagas/144a/2008079.html. 
44 The relevant link is: http://www.iaasa.ie/About-IAASA/Governance/Board-of-Directors. 
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Country MEMBERSHIP POWER RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE YEAR 
Luxembourg IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Netherlands  IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Norway  IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Poland IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
EC (2010) Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Portugal IFIAR (2013) 




Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Slovenia IFIAR (2014) 
Correspondence via email 
EC (2010) Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Slovakia IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Spain IFIAR (2013) 
POA website46 
Correspondence via email 
IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via email IFIAR (2013) 
Correspondence via email 
Sweden IFIAR (2013) IFIAR (2013) 
EC (2010) 
Correspondence via telephone IFIAR (2013) 
 
UK  IFIAR (2013) 








                                                 
45 The relevant links are: http://www.cnsa.pt/ and http://www.vasroc.pt/uploads/docs/CV_VBA.pdf. 
46 The relevant link is: http://www.icac.meh.es/. 
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Appendix 3: Public oversight systems in the EU 
Country POA MEMBERSHIP INSPECTION INVESTIGATION DISCIPLINE RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE 
YEAR 





ASA ASA Austrian Chamber of 
Certified Public 
Accountants 
Yes47 Quality Control for 
Statutory Audits 
Act/2006 
Belgium Chambre de Renvoi 














Yes49 Royal Decree of 21 
April 2007 
Royal Decree of 25 
April 2007 
Bulgaria Commission for 
Public Oversight of 
Statutory Auditors 
(CPOSA) 
Mixed CPOSA CPOSA CPOSA 
Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants 
Yes50 Independent Financial 
Audit Law/2008 
                                                 
47 Rating scale: satisfactory, satisfactory with comments, and unsatisfactory. 
48 Investigations are usually led by the ICA; however, the CRME may decide to appoint a special expert to investigate a case instead of the professional body (IFIAR 2013). 
49 Rating scale: satisfactory, satisfactory with minor weaknesses, recommendations to be addressed in a given period of time, new quality control in the following year, and refer to disciplinary 
court. 
50 Rating scale in the form of A, B, C and D. 
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Auditors of the 
Czech Republic 
Audit Public Oversight 
Council 
Chamber of Auditors 
of the Czech Republic 
Audit Public 
Oversight Council 
Chamber of Auditors 
of the Czech Republic 
No Act n.93 Coll. on 
Auditors/2009 










DCCA Disciplinary Board on 
Auditors 
No Danish Act on Approved 
Auditors and Audit 
Firms n.468/2008 
Finland Auditing Board of 
the Central Chamber 
of Commerce 
(AB3C) 
Mixed AB3C AB3C AB3C 
Auditing Board of the 
State 
No Auditing Act n.459/2007 
                                                 
51 The DCCA merged with two other agencies to become the Danish Business Authority with effect from 1 January 2012 (IFIAR 2013). 
52 The DCCA provides only secretarial assistance to the DSAA (Barfoed 2011). 
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Country POA MEMBERSHIP INSPECTION INVESTIGATION DISCIPLINE RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE 
YEAR 
France High Council for 
Statutory Audit 
(H3C) 






H3C may be referred 
to in case of appeals 
No Financial Security 
Law/2003 








No Auditor Oversight 
Act/2005 














No Law n.3148/2003 













Yes55 Act LXXV/2008 




Auditors Council Auditors Council 
Ministry of Industries 
and Innovation 
Yes56 Auditing Act/2009 
                                                 
53 H3C may also delegate some inspections to the Compagnie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC, National Company of Auditors) or the Compagnie Régionale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes de Paris (CRCC, Regional Company of Statutory Auditors of Paris) (EC 2010). 
54 WPK is the Chamber of Public Accountants. 
55 Rating scale in the form of A, B, C and D. 
56 Rating scale: satisfactory with no comments, satisfactory with comments, and non-satisfactory. 
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Country POA MEMBERSHIP INSPECTION INVESTIGATION DISCIPLINE RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE 
YEAR 









ACCA, ICAI, ICAEW, 
ICAS, CPA, IIPA 
IAASA 
ACCA, ICAI, 
ICAEW, ICAS, CPA, 
IIPA 




Nazionale per le 




CONSOB CONSOB CONSOB No Legislative Decree 
n.58/200759 









Chamber of Auditors 
Yes60 Law of the Republic of 
Lithuania on Audit/2008 






CSSF CSSF CSSF No Law of 18 
December/2009 
                                                 
57 ACCA is the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants; ICAI is the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland; ICAEW is the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales; ICAS is the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland; CPA is the Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Ireland; and IIPA is the Institute of Incorporated Public Accountants. 
58 The rating scale varies. In general, it is in the form of A, B, C and D. 
59 Legislative Decree n.58 (‘The Consolidated Law on Finance’ and following amendments) and its implementation measures constitute the main regulatory framework for CONSOB’s 
oversight activity. Its oversight of auditors and audit firms is further regulated by Legislative Decree n.39/2010, issued in order to fully implement Directive 2006/43/EC on statutory audits. 
60 Rating scale: no deficiencies, deficiencies, and material deficiencies. 
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Country POA MEMBERSHIP INSPECTION INVESTIGATION DISCIPLINE RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE 
YEAR 





AFM AFM AFM (for audit firms) 
Accountantskamer 
(Disciplinary Court 
for statutory auditors) 














No Financial Supervision 
Act/1992 
Poland Audit Oversight 
Commission 










No The Act/2009 
Portugal Conselho Nacional 









Comissão do Mercado 
de Valores Mobiliários 
(CMVM)64 
Yes65 Decree-Law n.225/2009 
                                                 
61 Rating scale: inadequate and not inadequate. 
62 All inspections of audit firms with listed firm engagements are performed by the FSA. The FSA also inspects statutory auditors who are not members of the Norwegian Institute of Public 
Accountants. For members of the institute, the FSA has issued guidelines on cooperation with the Institute where it performs quality assurance reviews of individual auditors. Nevertheless, the 
Institute performs its own additional inspections of members when deemed necessary (IFIAR 2013). 
63 OROC is the Portuguese Institute of Statutory Auditors. 
64 CMVM is the Portuguese Securities Market Commission. 
65 Rating scale: nothing to refer, with minor observations/recommendations, with relevant observations/recommendations, and unsatisfactory. 
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Country POA MEMBERSHIP INSPECTION INVESTIGATION DISCIPLINE RATING LAW/EFFECTIVE 
YEAR 
Slovakia Audit Oversight 
Authority 
Mixed Audit Oversight 
Authority 








Slovak Chamber of 
Auditors 
Yes66 Act n.540 Coll. on 
Auditors, Audit and 
Oversight of Audit/2007 









Slovenian Institute for 
Auditing 
APOA No Auditing Act/2008 
Spain Accounting and 
Auditing Institute 






No Royal Legislative 
Decree/2011 
Sweden Supervisory Board 
of Public 
Accountants 
Mixed Supervisory Board 
of Public 
Accountants 
Supervisory Board of 
Public Accountants 
Supervisory Board of 
Public Accountants 
No Auditors Act/2001:883 
UK Professional 
Oversight Board 















Yes69 Company Act/2004 
                                                 
66 Rating scale: C1, C2, C3 and C4 for assessment of organisation of activities; D1, D2, D3 and D4 for assessment of implementation of auditing standards. 
67 Following a major restructuring in 2013, public audit oversight falls under the direct remit of the FRC and its Conduct Committee. 
68 AADB is a separate body (part of the FRC) that does not operate under the supervision of POB (FRC 2011). 
69 Rating scale: Grade 1 - good; Grade 2 - limited improvements required; Grade 2b - improvements required; and Grade 4 - significant improvements required. 
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Appendix 4: Variable definitions for UK study 
(with Worldscope item numbers in square parentheses) 
Dependent variables  
AUDFEE_RAW Audit fees in thousands of British pounds [WS01801]. 
AUDFEE Natural log of audit fees in thousands of British pounds [WS01801]. 
SWITCH Equal to 1 if a client changed audit firm between the previous (t-1) and 
current (t) year, and 0 otherwise. 
AWCA Abnormal working capital accruals scaled by lagged total assets 
[WC02999] based on DeFond and Park (2001). Abnormal working 
capital accruals are calculated as Working Capitalt – (Working Capitalt-
1/Salest-1 [WC01001] * Salest [WC01001]. 
Working Capital is (current assets [WC02201] – cash and short term 
investment [WC02001]) – (current liability [WC03101] – short-term 
debt and current portion of long-term debt [WC03051]). 
TOT_ACCRUALS The difference between net income before extraordinary items 
[WC01551] and cash flow from operations [WC04860] scaled by 
lagged total assets [WC02999]. 
OPINION Dummy variable that equals 1 if the client receives a qualified audit 
opinion [WS07546], and 0 otherwise. 
Variables of interest  
PROC3 The proportion of engagements rated ‘Significant improvements 
required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit 
firm for a specific year. 
DIFFERENCE A dummy variable equal to 1 if PROC3 is above or equal to the mean 
value of PROC3 based on all audit firms and years in the sample, and 0 
otherwise. 
PROC2A The proportion of audit engagements with category 2A ratings (good 
with limited improvements required) in the total audit engagements 
reviewed for a specific year. 
PROC2B The proportion of audit engagements with category 2B ratings 
(improvements required) in the total audit engagements reviewed for a 
specific year. 
PROC3_LAGGED The proportion of engagements rated ‘significant improvements 
required’ (Category 3) over total engagements reviewed for each audit 
firm for the fiscal period two years previously. 
PROC3_BIG4 Conditional variable: PROC3 * Big4. 
PROC3_NON-BIG4 Conditional variable: PROC3 * (1 - Big4). 
Firm-specific controls  
BIG4 Dummy variable that equals 1 if the client uses one of the Big 4 audit 
firms, and 0 otherwise. 
SIZE Natural log of total assets in thousands of British pounds [WS02999]. 
LEVERAGE Ratio of long-term debt [WS03251] to total assets [WS02999]. 
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ROA Ratio of net income before extraordinary items [WC01551] to total 
assets [WS02999]. 
LOSS Dummy variable that equals 1 if the client reports a net loss [WS01651] 
in the current year, and 0 otherwise. 
LIQUIDITY Ratio of current assets [WS02201] to current liabilities [WS03101]. 
CFO Cash flow from operations [WC04860] scaled by total assets 
[WC02999].  
BM Book value of equity [WC03501] scaled by market value of equity 
[WC08001]. 
BUSY Dummy variable that equals 1 for fiscal year ending 31 December 
[WS05350], and 0 otherwise. 
NBS Natural log of 1 plus the number of business segments [WS19501, 
WS19511, WS19521, WS19531, WS19541, WS19551, WS19561, 
WS19571, WS19581, WS19591].  
NGS Natural log of 1 plus the number of geographical segments [WS19601, 
WS19611, WS19621, WS19631, WS19641, WS19651, WS19661, 
WS19671, WS19681, WS19691]. 
FORSALES Ratio of foreign sales to total sales [WS08731]. 
INVREC Ratio of the sum of inventories [WS02101] and receivables [WS02051] 
to total assets [WS02999]. 
SALES_GROWTH Sales increase (or decrease) from year t-1 to year t scaled by lagged 
sales [WC01001]. 
LITIGIOUS Dummy variable that equals 1 if SIC [WS07021, WS07022, WS07023] 
is 2833–2836, 3570–3577, 3600–3674, 5200–5961, or 7370–7374 
(biotechnology, computers, electronics or retailing), and 0 otherwise. 
AGE The natural log of the age of the client, which is the number of years 
since the client was listed [BDATE]. 
CASH Money available for use in the normal operations of the company 
[WS02003]. 
MISMATCH 1 if a client firm is mismatched with the type of audit firm (Big4 or not) 
that it is using, and 0 otherwise. The measure is estimated separately for 
each sample year. The estimation procedure is based on Shu (2000). 
The data necessary to measure this variable (i.e. total assets [WS02999], 
goodwill/cost in excess of assets purchased [WS18280], external 
financing [WS04500], net income before extraordinary items/preferred 
dividends [WS01551], book value of equity [WC03501] and market 
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